Avatar is being billed must-see as the most expensive movie ever made.
As the actual production costs are not, for the genre, unusually excessive, it appears -- if the billing it to be believed -- that it is the marketing budget that broke records.
One wonders why with a film promising a revolutionarily magical viewing experience and fawningly reviewed by the best critics requires record-setting marketing.
Not all the buzz has been positive. Following South Park, many have derided the film as "Dances With Smurfs". The Independant sees the film as an "allegory of US adventurism in the Middle East". One conservative blogger crudely, labels the film "Liberal Porn of Doe-eyed nature lovers killing Marines," another simply questions "drawing the audience to cheer the brutal deaths of Americans."
Avatar's opening weekend -- hurt by an east coast snow storm -- appears to roughly track that of the awfully reviewed 2012, with relatively mediocre domestic revenue supplemented by strong performance overseas (where, presumably, fewer people have qualms cheering the brutal deaths of Americans).
The performance of Sherlock Holmes, which opens this friday, may provide a rough baseline to calculate how much 20th Century Fox and James Cameron cost themselves by injecting divisive politics into their blockbuster movie.
Sunday, December 20, 2009
Saturday, December 19, 2009
Fourth and Two
Bill Belichek widely admired (or, depending on one’s perspective, reviled) as a cold-hearted football coaching genius, was widely attacked for, against conventional wisdom, choosing to go for a fourth and two from his own 29 and losing the game. Two New York Times blogs (here and here) defend the decision, calculating that he made the statistically correct decision for the team, if not for his career. Bill Simmons undermines that statistical argument by noting that the assumed odds of making a fourth and two are meaningfully different than converting a two point conversion.
Given the ultimate fuzziness of the statistical argument, whether one condemns or defends Belichek’s choice would seem to reduce, more or less, to whether one prefers to defer to, or align with, the genius coach or the accepted practice.
It is worth understanding that beneath the presented alternatives lie divergent sets of values. The accepted practice, in the end, argues that the Patriots should not have beaten themselves. If Indy was able to drive seventy yards in two minutes for the touchdown, they deserved the win. To this way of thinking, the job of a coach is not as much to directly give his team the best chance of winning, as it is to put the best team on the field. Belichek supporters disregard the testimony of former players – since, to some degree, supported by the Patriots subsequent performance -- that Belichek’s choice came at the expense of the product-on-the-field.
In the end, Belicheck likely did not have finely tuned statistical analysis on hand. The call more likely came from his gut. As he described it, he saw a chance to win and took it.
Given the ultimate fuzziness of the statistical argument, whether one condemns or defends Belichek’s choice would seem to reduce, more or less, to whether one prefers to defer to, or align with, the genius coach or the accepted practice.
It is worth understanding that beneath the presented alternatives lie divergent sets of values. The accepted practice, in the end, argues that the Patriots should not have beaten themselves. If Indy was able to drive seventy yards in two minutes for the touchdown, they deserved the win. To this way of thinking, the job of a coach is not as much to directly give his team the best chance of winning, as it is to put the best team on the field. Belichek supporters disregard the testimony of former players – since, to some degree, supported by the Patriots subsequent performance -- that Belichek’s choice came at the expense of the product-on-the-field.
In the end, Belicheck likely did not have finely tuned statistical analysis on hand. The call more likely came from his gut. As he described it, he saw a chance to win and took it.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
2012
The political foolishness of the common Conservative tendency to tar anyone to one's left with a common brush is more and more apparent.
While we do seem to have on the right a more defined topology of competing views -- witness the more idealogical difference between, for example, McCain and Huckabee, compared to that between Obama and Hillary -- there does appear to be at least one increasingly sharp division on the left.
The root of this division is the natural tendency of power to seek more power, which in politics results in the governing party seeking to expand the power of government. The greatest example of this is how the party of Ronald Reagan became the party of W Bush.
For all the efforts made, big government conservatism was always ill fitting and mostly shucked once Republicans lost power.
On the left, however, there is a strong core -- perhaps up to 15% of the electorate -- of, for lack of a better label, Socialists, who ideologically support an ever-expanding government. In the other corner of the left are -- again, for lack of a better label -- Liberals who believe that Government ought be part of the solution to national problems, but who also share, to some degree, with conservatives, belief in the traditional classically liberal American values.
With Obama's election, the "Socialists" are in now power and the "Liberals" appear to be slowly getting squeamish.
The earliest manifestation of this was, perhaps, Joe Lieberman's excommunication. Lieberman, who volunteered for Bobby Kennedy and freedom summer, remains very much a traditional Liberal. In his principled opposition to the current push for socialized medicine he expressed a very Liberal creed: "Sometimes the private sector does things that are wrong, and when they do, you regulate—sometimes you litigate, But never in the history of America ... have we tried to keep one industry honest by having government go into that business to compete with the industry."
Another illustration is Jon Stewart's antipathy towards the groupthink that increasingly appears to be part of global warming science -- intellectual integrity and independence is a core value of the Liberal, but not Socialist, left.
In an editorial today, the Times stated unambiguously its common-sense position that a bank that is too big too fail ought not be allowed to exist. The Socialists in power prefer, instead, to expand the power of government further by entrenching and controlling the largest firms.
In the 2012 elections, Republicans will have the option of nominating a staunch conservative who in the best of circumstances could win less than 55% of the vote. Democrats, then, would likely continue to respond with (stealth) Socialist candidates and our politics would continue to be played in the red zone.
I pray -- though am not optimistic -- that Republicans will find the wisdom to choose a principled moderate who can remind Liberals of our shared values. Such a candidate could hope to win upwards 60% of the vote, with meaningful coattails, presenting Democrats with the choice of marginalizing their Socialists or facing political irrelevance.
While we do seem to have on the right a more defined topology of competing views -- witness the more idealogical difference between, for example, McCain and Huckabee, compared to that between Obama and Hillary -- there does appear to be at least one increasingly sharp division on the left.
The root of this division is the natural tendency of power to seek more power, which in politics results in the governing party seeking to expand the power of government. The greatest example of this is how the party of Ronald Reagan became the party of W Bush.
For all the efforts made, big government conservatism was always ill fitting and mostly shucked once Republicans lost power.
On the left, however, there is a strong core -- perhaps up to 15% of the electorate -- of, for lack of a better label, Socialists, who ideologically support an ever-expanding government. In the other corner of the left are -- again, for lack of a better label -- Liberals who believe that Government ought be part of the solution to national problems, but who also share, to some degree, with conservatives, belief in the traditional classically liberal American values.
With Obama's election, the "Socialists" are in now power and the "Liberals" appear to be slowly getting squeamish.
The earliest manifestation of this was, perhaps, Joe Lieberman's excommunication. Lieberman, who volunteered for Bobby Kennedy and freedom summer, remains very much a traditional Liberal. In his principled opposition to the current push for socialized medicine he expressed a very Liberal creed: "Sometimes the private sector does things that are wrong, and when they do, you regulate—sometimes you litigate, But never in the history of America ... have we tried to keep one industry honest by having government go into that business to compete with the industry."
Another illustration is Jon Stewart's antipathy towards the groupthink that increasingly appears to be part of global warming science -- intellectual integrity and independence is a core value of the Liberal, but not Socialist, left.
In an editorial today, the Times stated unambiguously its common-sense position that a bank that is too big too fail ought not be allowed to exist. The Socialists in power prefer, instead, to expand the power of government further by entrenching and controlling the largest firms.
In the 2012 elections, Republicans will have the option of nominating a staunch conservative who in the best of circumstances could win less than 55% of the vote. Democrats, then, would likely continue to respond with (stealth) Socialist candidates and our politics would continue to be played in the red zone.
I pray -- though am not optimistic -- that Republicans will find the wisdom to choose a principled moderate who can remind Liberals of our shared values. Such a candidate could hope to win upwards 60% of the vote, with meaningful coattails, presenting Democrats with the choice of marginalizing their Socialists or facing political irrelevance.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Shared Intentionality
From the Science Times: We May Be Born With an Urge to Help
The article opens by claiming biologists are overturning dour traditional -- that of philosophers, theologians, and parents -- notions of human nature. They have found that human children are naturally more helpful, co-operative and social than chimpanzees.
The article centers on a book by a Dr Tomasello who teaches that children develop "shared intentionality", described as the propensity to abide by, and enforce, social norms, which he believes parents ought reinforce. To Dr Tomasello -- a co-director of an institute for evolutionary anthropology -- shared intentionality evolved very early on -- it is handy when hunting -- and is a foundation of human culture.
The article then quotes one Dr. de Waal, a primatologist, who teaches that humans are naturally empathetic -- only psychopaths are not -- and therefore the humaneness of societies is, thankfully, ground in biology, not "the whims of politics, culture or religion."
The article notes (in an apparent non sequitur) that "experiments have shown that people will reject unfair distributions of money even it means they receive nothing" and, more relevantly, is fair enough to acknowledge that social norms may, in part, be enforced negatively and that warfare is also an expression of this human capacity for co-operation. It concludes with one final lesson from Dr. Tomasello that "we are both selfish and altruistic at the same time."
This final lesson is, of course, very consistent with the traditional teachings that the article claimed biologists were overturning.
Above all, the article is wonderfully self-referencing. Enforced social norms apply as much to thought as to behavior. Without them, those who easily imagine the roots of human nature as adapted to prehistoric lifestyles would have less difficulty understating how our traditional political, cultural and religious structures might be adapted to human nature (and, in turn, human nature to them). More-over, if there is, here, a new way of thinking upending previously established norms, it is brought about by people raised to rebel against any naturally developed shared intentionality.
The article opens by claiming biologists are overturning dour traditional -- that of philosophers, theologians, and parents -- notions of human nature. They have found that human children are naturally more helpful, co-operative and social than chimpanzees.
The article centers on a book by a Dr Tomasello who teaches that children develop "shared intentionality", described as the propensity to abide by, and enforce, social norms, which he believes parents ought reinforce. To Dr Tomasello -- a co-director of an institute for evolutionary anthropology -- shared intentionality evolved very early on -- it is handy when hunting -- and is a foundation of human culture.
The article then quotes one Dr. de Waal, a primatologist, who teaches that humans are naturally empathetic -- only psychopaths are not -- and therefore the humaneness of societies is, thankfully, ground in biology, not "the whims of politics, culture or religion."
The article notes (in an apparent non sequitur) that "experiments have shown that people will reject unfair distributions of money even it means they receive nothing" and, more relevantly, is fair enough to acknowledge that social norms may, in part, be enforced negatively and that warfare is also an expression of this human capacity for co-operation. It concludes with one final lesson from Dr. Tomasello that "we are both selfish and altruistic at the same time."
This final lesson is, of course, very consistent with the traditional teachings that the article claimed biologists were overturning.
Above all, the article is wonderfully self-referencing. Enforced social norms apply as much to thought as to behavior. Without them, those who easily imagine the roots of human nature as adapted to prehistoric lifestyles would have less difficulty understating how our traditional political, cultural and religious structures might be adapted to human nature (and, in turn, human nature to them). More-over, if there is, here, a new way of thinking upending previously established norms, it is brought about by people raised to rebel against any naturally developed shared intentionality.
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Monoculture
One recurring trope on this blog is Von Hayek's teaching that government ought to garden more and sculpt less.
I was watching The Botany of Desire on PBS, based on the book by Michael Pollan. The film argues against monoculture. According to the film, people want, for example, their french fries, to always taste in a similar manner, what Pollan labels "monoculture-on-the-plate". The film faults free markets for too efficiently meeting this desire via "monoculture-on-the-farm". In a state of nature, crops evolve immunities to pests. In monoculture agriculture, where biological diversity, and so natural adaptation, is suppressed, pesticide is required in increasing quantity. This is expensive, creating demand for genetically engineered crops. As pests, unrestricted by monoculture, continue to adapt, a little genetic engineering creates the need for ever more genetic engineering. All to replace, but not really improve, a function that nature more respected well serves.
It is worth noting that diners tend to choose diversity-on-the-plate. The closer the food people eat is to the farm, the greater the economic pressure for diversity-on-the-farm. The economic pressure toward monoculture stems, in part, from consumer preference for the bounty of technology and, in part, from monoculture in the markets.
The analogue between all this and economic/financial-services regulation is self-evident, if likely missed by folks like Pollan given that, within our politics, evolution and free markets are placed in opposing corners. Von Hayek teaches that Darwin actually liberally applied ideas from Smith. Conceptually and historically, Von Hayek would seem right. The competing political alignment points to the limit of his otherwise brilliant work.
I was watching The Botany of Desire on PBS, based on the book by Michael Pollan. The film argues against monoculture. According to the film, people want, for example, their french fries, to always taste in a similar manner, what Pollan labels "monoculture-on-the-plate". The film faults free markets for too efficiently meeting this desire via "monoculture-on-the-farm". In a state of nature, crops evolve immunities to pests. In monoculture agriculture, where biological diversity, and so natural adaptation, is suppressed, pesticide is required in increasing quantity. This is expensive, creating demand for genetically engineered crops. As pests, unrestricted by monoculture, continue to adapt, a little genetic engineering creates the need for ever more genetic engineering. All to replace, but not really improve, a function that nature more respected well serves.
It is worth noting that diners tend to choose diversity-on-the-plate. The closer the food people eat is to the farm, the greater the economic pressure for diversity-on-the-farm. The economic pressure toward monoculture stems, in part, from consumer preference for the bounty of technology and, in part, from monoculture in the markets.
The analogue between all this and economic/financial-services regulation is self-evident, if likely missed by folks like Pollan given that, within our politics, evolution and free markets are placed in opposing corners. Von Hayek teaches that Darwin actually liberally applied ideas from Smith. Conceptually and historically, Von Hayek would seem right. The competing political alignment points to the limit of his otherwise brilliant work.
Thursday, November 5, 2009
Political Architecture
As a software developer, I am in the habit of thinking about the manner in which the architecture of a process controls its results.
In the case of congressional decision making, the "primitives" (in the software, not anthropological sense) are Congressfolk whose above-all-else motivation is re-election.
There are two rough dynamics which control re-election. Many Congressfolk -- Representatives from highly gerrymandered districts and Senators from reliably red or blue States -- have relatively safe seats. These Congressfolk face greater risk of being primaried out -- for being too moderate for their base -- than losing in the general election for being too partisan or idealogical. Other Congressfolk, facing more competitive electorates, can ill afford being seen as too partisan or idealogical.
Congressional seniority rules guarrantee that party leadership will be largely composed of the less moderate safe seats Congressfolk.
Best of the Web points out that Pelosi's healthcare push, surprising in light of the election, is good for her personal re-election prospects.
At this point the argument that the interest of Blue Dog Democrats lies in opposing the Obama agenda, is wrong headed. Voters angry with Obama or Pelosi are not going to vote for Democrats, whatever their voting records. If Republicans really wanted to kibbosh the Obama agenda they would offer Blue Dogs a place under their big tent. They, of course, have other motivations.
The limiting constraint on the radicalism of the safe seated Congressfolk is that their power depends on the size of their caucus which depends on their ability to recruit and re-elect moderate candidates. It is likely too late for the moderate candidates recruited by Democrats the past two cycles and this will all serve to discourage future recruitment.
It was once said that American politics operated between the forty-yard lines. Since the passage of McCain/Finegold, American politics operates more stably in the red zone.
In the case of congressional decision making, the "primitives" (in the software, not anthropological sense) are Congressfolk whose above-all-else motivation is re-election.
There are two rough dynamics which control re-election. Many Congressfolk -- Representatives from highly gerrymandered districts and Senators from reliably red or blue States -- have relatively safe seats. These Congressfolk face greater risk of being primaried out -- for being too moderate for their base -- than losing in the general election for being too partisan or idealogical. Other Congressfolk, facing more competitive electorates, can ill afford being seen as too partisan or idealogical.
Congressional seniority rules guarrantee that party leadership will be largely composed of the less moderate safe seats Congressfolk.
Best of the Web points out that Pelosi's healthcare push, surprising in light of the election, is good for her personal re-election prospects.
At this point the argument that the interest of Blue Dog Democrats lies in opposing the Obama agenda, is wrong headed. Voters angry with Obama or Pelosi are not going to vote for Democrats, whatever their voting records. If Republicans really wanted to kibbosh the Obama agenda they would offer Blue Dogs a place under their big tent. They, of course, have other motivations.
The limiting constraint on the radicalism of the safe seated Congressfolk is that their power depends on the size of their caucus which depends on their ability to recruit and re-elect moderate candidates. It is likely too late for the moderate candidates recruited by Democrats the past two cycles and this will all serve to discourage future recruitment.
It was once said that American politics operated between the forty-yard lines. Since the passage of McCain/Finegold, American politics operates more stably in the red zone.
Sunday, November 1, 2009
Incendiary
A Huffington Post post complains about over-cautious media coverage of the California gang-rape and speculates that coverage would be far more aggressive was it "a 15 year old middle class girl was gang raped by black and Latino men outside a suburban homecoming dance."
The incident is, itself, frightening. The attack went on for more than two hours, with dozens of witnesses, some of whom encouraged the attackers, none of whom notified authorities. The victim was a church-going honors student.
Through their pastor, the her family has requested:
Reading between the lines of the reporting, there is some reason to believe that the victim was white. If so, exceedingly cautious reporting is very much called for.
However responsible the reporting, as the facts emerge, the concerns of the Richmond High students will be well founded. If the past is a guide, well meaning people will, then, accuse any who do not believe "this could have happened anywhere" of prejudice. That narrative will not sell: Parents will not easily be convinced that it is bigotry to believe their own community's sons better raised.
If the more damaging, ethnic, narrative takes hold, it would be more tragic for being untrue.
I have previously posted about the social cost of the view that teaches people -- like Olachi Obioma -- to blame an unjust society for their own lack of achievement. In the end, we -- and not some alien culture -- are the ones who taught these kids that their behavior is not their responsibility.
The incident is, itself, frightening. The attack went on for more than two hours, with dozens of witnesses, some of whom encouraged the attackers, none of whom notified authorities. The victim was a church-going honors student.
Through their pastor, the her family has requested:
Please do not respond to this tragic event by promoting hatred or by causing more pain. We have had enough violence already in this place. If you need to express your outrage, please channel your anger into positive action....Richmond High students want outsiders to stop calling them animals and savages. "We feel like they're blaming the school," an angry senior complained at a school board meeting I attended Wednesday night. "It wasn't nobody's fault," she said. "People shouldn't be pointing fingers."
And school officials are making sure to emphasize the tragedies that didn't happen.
The homecoming dance "was a success in terms of safety because nothing happened at the event," a campus police officer announced. "We have a safe environment at Richmond High."
...
The troublemakers at Richmond are emulating what they see in popular culture. "A lot of them, they don't think they're going to be successful," said junior Olachi Obioma. "They've already been judged, so they go with that. They drink, they smoke, they pop pills. It's the 'bad boy' culture. That's how they see themselves."
...
Or they didn't intervene because they didn't know the girl and didn't feel compelled to help a stranger. On a big, racially mixed campus like Richmond, you stick with your own and mind your business.Reading between the lines of the reporting, there is some reason to believe that the victim was white. If so, exceedingly cautious reporting is very much called for.
However responsible the reporting, as the facts emerge, the concerns of the Richmond High students will be well founded. If the past is a guide, well meaning people will, then, accuse any who do not believe "this could have happened anywhere" of prejudice. That narrative will not sell: Parents will not easily be convinced that it is bigotry to believe their own community's sons better raised.
If the more damaging, ethnic, narrative takes hold, it would be more tragic for being untrue.
I have previously posted about the social cost of the view that teaches people -- like Olachi Obioma -- to blame an unjust society for their own lack of achievement. In the end, we -- and not some alien culture -- are the ones who taught these kids that their behavior is not their responsibility.
Thursday, October 29, 2009
SuperFreakonomics
The authors of SuperFreakonomics, Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, make what is, at face, a straightforward economic claim: Faced with a serious problem (global warming) and given the option of two sorts of solutions, one (geoengineering) which costs an order of magnitude less then the other (carbon emission reduction), why spend more?
Some argue that there are not really two sorts of solutions, that geoengineering is unlikely to practically work. With admitted ignorance of the technology, I think -- at this point -- its fair to observe that changing the behavior of billions of people, and against many of their narrow, short-term, interests is not entirely practical itself.
The scientist most relied on by L&D, Ken Caldeira, doesn't share their conclusion, in part, for a different reason: he apparently believes carbon emission is "essentially immoral" just like "mugging little old ladies". L&D view this moralistic, as opposed to analytical, approach to be, in some form, religious.
While L&D do take perverse joy in challenging traditional moral assumptions -- eg: pimps up -- their analysis is not simply amoral. Their claim is ultimately Machiavellian: better, more moral, outcomes, can be realized through cold-hearted, amoral, analysis than by adherence to pious orthodoxies.
The traditional, religious, understanding, shunned by all sides in this debate, is that people generally act moral less out of analytical, or empathetic, judgments of right and wrong, than out of force of habit guided by the weight of culture and tradition. Where this weight is removed, people have a frightening tendency to, for example, murder little old ladies and mug defenseless children.
It is hard, then, to imagine that the behavior of billions of people will be peacefully changed to meaningfully reduce their carbon footprint without harnessing the weight of culture and tradition to attach a notion of something like sin to carbon emission.
Some argue that there are not really two sorts of solutions, that geoengineering is unlikely to practically work. With admitted ignorance of the technology, I think -- at this point -- its fair to observe that changing the behavior of billions of people, and against many of their narrow, short-term, interests is not entirely practical itself.
The scientist most relied on by L&D, Ken Caldeira, doesn't share their conclusion, in part, for a different reason: he apparently believes carbon emission is "essentially immoral" just like "mugging little old ladies". L&D view this moralistic, as opposed to analytical, approach to be, in some form, religious.
While L&D do take perverse joy in challenging traditional moral assumptions -- eg: pimps up -- their analysis is not simply amoral. Their claim is ultimately Machiavellian: better, more moral, outcomes, can be realized through cold-hearted, amoral, analysis than by adherence to pious orthodoxies.
The traditional, religious, understanding, shunned by all sides in this debate, is that people generally act moral less out of analytical, or empathetic, judgments of right and wrong, than out of force of habit guided by the weight of culture and tradition. Where this weight is removed, people have a frightening tendency to, for example, murder little old ladies and mug defenseless children.
It is hard, then, to imagine that the behavior of billions of people will be peacefully changed to meaningfully reduce their carbon footprint without harnessing the weight of culture and tradition to attach a notion of something like sin to carbon emission.
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Behind the Numbers
Of all the numbers trending in the GOP's favor perhaps the most signifigant this: In April 2008, 75% of Independents believed there was solid evidence for Global Warming. Today only 53% do.
One of the important emerging political trends is increasing Democratic competitiveness in the Mountain West: Three 2004 Mountain Red States turned Blue for Obama, and a fourth was friggin close. In April 2008, the region polled 75%-21% believing in global warming. Today the region -- at 44% - 42% -- is the most skeptical in the nation.
Another, similar trend involved college graduates. In 2004, their vote was split, in 2008 they went 53% - 45% for Obama. In April 2008, 75% of Independent college graduates believed in Global Warming, today only 56% do.
In both cases, a strong contributor to increasing Democratic support was the perception that the Republican Party, personified by W & Sarah Palin, stood, blinded by, or hostage to, ideology and theology, increasingly anti-science and even anti-thought. The Democrats with increasing success portrayed themselves as the thinking person's alternative. The success of this perception was reflected in the public trust for Global Warming science vouched strongly for by Democrats and questioned, with equal fervor, by Republicans.
Republicans have done precious little in the past year and a half to counter the perception that they couldn't think less. In these numbers lies rapidly falling public faith in the reasonableness of Democrats.
One of the important emerging political trends is increasing Democratic competitiveness in the Mountain West: Three 2004 Mountain Red States turned Blue for Obama, and a fourth was friggin close. In April 2008, the region polled 75%-21% believing in global warming. Today the region -- at 44% - 42% -- is the most skeptical in the nation.
Another, similar trend involved college graduates. In 2004, their vote was split, in 2008 they went 53% - 45% for Obama. In April 2008, 75% of Independent college graduates believed in Global Warming, today only 56% do.
In both cases, a strong contributor to increasing Democratic support was the perception that the Republican Party, personified by W & Sarah Palin, stood, blinded by, or hostage to, ideology and theology, increasingly anti-science and even anti-thought. The Democrats with increasing success portrayed themselves as the thinking person's alternative. The success of this perception was reflected in the public trust for Global Warming science vouched strongly for by Democrats and questioned, with equal fervor, by Republicans.
Republicans have done precious little in the past year and a half to counter the perception that they couldn't think less. In these numbers lies rapidly falling public faith in the reasonableness of Democrats.
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Kwame Anthony Appiah
In his most recent column, David Brooks quotes Princeton professor Kwame Anthony Appiah (leaving some ambiguity as to whether he shares the opinion) as distinguishing between the "philosopher's" view of possessing character and virtue and the "psychologist's" view of being a "community of competing selves" which "are continually popping in and out of existence... have different desires, and they fight for control - bargaining with, deceiving, and plotting against one another." This latter view is propped up by "a century's worth of experiments" which show people often behave differently in different contexts.
Arguing against a straw man is one tell tale sign of a weak claim. Classical thinkers, of course, even without the benefit of psychological "experiments", understood well our divided and competing natures (after all, they were people too!). They taught stories of heroes with character and virtue, not to raise awareness of our true, or fixed, nature but to encourage our better angels. Their central insight was that behavior is largely habitual and habits can, largely, be developed.
Stripped, then, of its scientific pretense, this "psychologist" critique is merely functional. It offers -- actually, sells -- greater self-satisfaction. The traditional teaching promotes better behavior.
From a societal perspective, the classical view is obviously more beneficial. Which is, in the end, to be expected of a teaching that has passed the test of time.
Arguing against a straw man is one tell tale sign of a weak claim. Classical thinkers, of course, even without the benefit of psychological "experiments", understood well our divided and competing natures (after all, they were people too!). They taught stories of heroes with character and virtue, not to raise awareness of our true, or fixed, nature but to encourage our better angels. Their central insight was that behavior is largely habitual and habits can, largely, be developed.
Stripped, then, of its scientific pretense, this "psychologist" critique is merely functional. It offers -- actually, sells -- greater self-satisfaction. The traditional teaching promotes better behavior.
From a societal perspective, the classical view is obviously more beneficial. Which is, in the end, to be expected of a teaching that has passed the test of time.
Monday, October 19, 2009
Babies with Candy
In his latest NYTimes column, Nobel Laureate, Paul Krugman is in (recycled) whining mode. Highlights:
The truth of the matter is more complicated than Krugman would like you to think. This deep into the credit crisis, even Nobel winning, NYTimes column writing, Princeton professors ought to understand the manner in which bank lending is tied to fixed income security markets (where the bulk of Goldman's reported profits came from).
Main Street, was not, as Krugman pretends, an innocent victim of Wall Street's misdeeds. Main Street, hand in hand with Wall Street, borrowed far more money than it was able to pay back, leading up to the crash.
To spur any recovery, of course, businesses require funding. Krugman's apparent view that this best comes from a return to not-entirely-responsible lending seems perverse. More obviously sensible would be tax cuts and reduced regulatory burdens.
Finally, the notion that financial reform will decrease risk taking is something other than evidence-based. Consider a recent Journal column detailing the Government's hand in almost 2/3s of all bad mortgages.
Krugman is right, of course, to be concerned about the agency costs embedded in our financial system. But legislators and regulators, as much as bankers, play games with other people's money. Was Krugman more honestly concerned he would be more in favor (de-)regulatory policies that gave people more control over their own money.
...Goldman Sachs is making record profits... banks that are actually in the business of lending, as opposed to trading, are still in trouble...
while the wheeler-dealer side of the financial industry, a k a trading operations, is highly profitable again, the part of banking that really matters — lending, which fuels investment and job creation — is not...
In the first phase of the crisis, Main Street was punished for Wall Street’s misdeeds; now broad economic distress, especially persistent high unemployment, is leading to big losses on mortgage loans and credit cards.
And here’s the thing: The continuing weakness of many banks is helping to perpetuate that economic distress. Banks remain reluctant to lend, and tight credit, especially for small businesses, stands in the way of the strong recovery we need...
we desperately need to pass effective financial reform. For if we don't, bankers will soon be taking even bigger risks than they did in the run-up to this crisis... When bankers gamble with other people's money, it's heads they win, tails the rest of us lose.
The truth of the matter is more complicated than Krugman would like you to think. This deep into the credit crisis, even Nobel winning, NYTimes column writing, Princeton professors ought to understand the manner in which bank lending is tied to fixed income security markets (where the bulk of Goldman's reported profits came from).
Main Street, was not, as Krugman pretends, an innocent victim of Wall Street's misdeeds. Main Street, hand in hand with Wall Street, borrowed far more money than it was able to pay back, leading up to the crash.
To spur any recovery, of course, businesses require funding. Krugman's apparent view that this best comes from a return to not-entirely-responsible lending seems perverse. More obviously sensible would be tax cuts and reduced regulatory burdens.
Finally, the notion that financial reform will decrease risk taking is something other than evidence-based. Consider a recent Journal column detailing the Government's hand in almost 2/3s of all bad mortgages.
Krugman is right, of course, to be concerned about the agency costs embedded in our financial system. But legislators and regulators, as much as bankers, play games with other people's money. Was Krugman more honestly concerned he would be more in favor (de-)regulatory policies that gave people more control over their own money.
Saturday, October 17, 2009
A Radical Proposal
As noted here previously, one of the true causes of systemic risk in our financial system is the FDIC. A bank account is, simply, an unsecured loan to the bank. Because accounts are "insured" by the FDIC, account holders are not as concerned about banks engaging in risky behavior as unsecured lenders would otherwise be. In theory, the FDIC should be so concerned and could set appropriate terms. In practice, of course, well, here we are.
On the other hand, without FDIC insurance we face an increase risk of bank runs, which can cause liquidity crises, and so threaten the economy. Even without FDIC insurance people seeking return on their savings would still put their money in banks, it would simply be less "sticky" and therefore more systemic-ly risky.
Finally, our Government is a massive borrower, largely from foreign sources. At this point, realistically, we carry debt that can only be rolled, not -- ever -- be payed back.
Given all this, the sensible thing -- to me -- would seem to be the Government acting, itself, as a retail bank. Instead of holding accounts that are, in effect, loans to Chase, subsidized by the government, individuals should be able to open accounts that are, in effect, loans to the Government. Private banks could play a customer-facing/administrative role as a DMV-style customer interface would kill the project. Better, I think, to finance as much of our debt in this manner as possible, than borrowing more from abroad. Once this system is set up, FDIC insurance could be wound down in a reasonable manner (eg: lowering the amount covered by a certain percentage annually).
The main public-interest negative I can see in this is that it in its structure acknowledges the permanence of our national debt. But that is simply facing reality.
Facing a different sort of reality: Too many vested interests make too much money off of FDIC insured accounts for this sort of reform to ever have a chance.
On the other hand, without FDIC insurance we face an increase risk of bank runs, which can cause liquidity crises, and so threaten the economy. Even without FDIC insurance people seeking return on their savings would still put their money in banks, it would simply be less "sticky" and therefore more systemic-ly risky.
Finally, our Government is a massive borrower, largely from foreign sources. At this point, realistically, we carry debt that can only be rolled, not -- ever -- be payed back.
Given all this, the sensible thing -- to me -- would seem to be the Government acting, itself, as a retail bank. Instead of holding accounts that are, in effect, loans to Chase, subsidized by the government, individuals should be able to open accounts that are, in effect, loans to the Government. Private banks could play a customer-facing/administrative role as a DMV-style customer interface would kill the project. Better, I think, to finance as much of our debt in this manner as possible, than borrowing more from abroad. Once this system is set up, FDIC insurance could be wound down in a reasonable manner (eg: lowering the amount covered by a certain percentage annually).
The main public-interest negative I can see in this is that it in its structure acknowledges the permanence of our national debt. But that is simply facing reality.
Facing a different sort of reality: Too many vested interests make too much money off of FDIC insured accounts for this sort of reform to ever have a chance.
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
Of Predators
Thomas Frank writing in the Journal argues that Republicans misunderstand, and therefore misuse, when they -- borrowing James K. Galbraith's construct -- identify the Government as a Predator. To Frank and Galbraith the Government is only a Predator when it serves evil corporate, as opposed to public, interests.
Last week, I criticized Sheila Bair for her transparent attempt to preserve the solvency of her agency by stealing from secured creditors. In fairness to her, she merely wanted to get in on the scam the administration has already facilitated for the UAW and JP Morgan.
Sensible people, including the President, understand that one of the core problems with the our health-care system is its employer centric-ness. While Democrats have mostly ignored the sensible conservative proposal to extend to individuals the tax advantages that privilege corporate provided coverage, Sen Ron Wyden (D, Oregon) did propose a reasonable, if convoluted, bi-partisan ammendment, that in some circumstances would have given some employees more control of their coverage. Big Business and Big Labor joined hands, were blessed by the President, and the offending proposal was (shamefully) killed.
These sorts of policy choices are the rule, not the exception. As noted previously, Republicans are, for the time being, without power in Washington and, so, if Government is now acting the Predator, it is doing so without their corrupting influence.
The classical, which is to say conservative, teaching on the subject is "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." In this view, it is Frank and Galbraith who are hopelessly unable to appreciate the predator gene in the DNA of our leviathan state.
Last week, I criticized Sheila Bair for her transparent attempt to preserve the solvency of her agency by stealing from secured creditors. In fairness to her, she merely wanted to get in on the scam the administration has already facilitated for the UAW and JP Morgan.
Sensible people, including the President, understand that one of the core problems with the our health-care system is its employer centric-ness. While Democrats have mostly ignored the sensible conservative proposal to extend to individuals the tax advantages that privilege corporate provided coverage, Sen Ron Wyden (D, Oregon) did propose a reasonable, if convoluted, bi-partisan ammendment, that in some circumstances would have given some employees more control of their coverage. Big Business and Big Labor joined hands, were blessed by the President, and the offending proposal was (shamefully) killed.
These sorts of policy choices are the rule, not the exception. As noted previously, Republicans are, for the time being, without power in Washington and, so, if Government is now acting the Predator, it is doing so without their corrupting influence.
The classical, which is to say conservative, teaching on the subject is "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." In this view, it is Frank and Galbraith who are hopelessly unable to appreciate the predator gene in the DNA of our leviathan state.
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
Sustainable Growth Rate
Conservative critics who reject the notion of that you can reduce deficits by spending trillions miss, in part, the boat. As discussed previously, the driving force behind Health Care Reform is the curve by which Medicare promises to bankrupt the country. The logic is sound, if solipstic. Medicare contains a straight-foward, if uncreative, cost containment mechanism: legislative fiat. Unsurprisingly, overly aggressive limits cause doctors to leave the program. To maintain doctor participation, Congress has had to repeatedly override mandated caps. The proposed reform addresses this with equal uncreative straight-fowardness: If there is no market paying higher prices, doctors will be forced to accept the capped price.
The basic laws of supply and demand teach that this is not a long-term solution. Pushing down price in this manner will, inevitably, push down supply. Not only that, but the goal is, of course, to dramatically increase demand.
The apparent plan for this is a bit more creative. The idea is to privilege primary care physicians at the expense of more skilled, more expensive specialists. Considering that the current crop of primary care physicians functionally failed out of Med School, there will then be little reason not to lower standards. If Med School is made easier, more like, for example, Nursing School, you can expect to have enough primary care physicians, at lower cost, to handle the expanded demand.
There will, of course, sooner than later, be a dramatic shortage of specialists (with one notable exception). For that, the President and Congressional Democrats do have a straight forward, if somewhat copycat, plan: IBGYBG.
The basic laws of supply and demand teach that this is not a long-term solution. Pushing down price in this manner will, inevitably, push down supply. Not only that, but the goal is, of course, to dramatically increase demand.
The apparent plan for this is a bit more creative. The idea is to privilege primary care physicians at the expense of more skilled, more expensive specialists. Considering that the current crop of primary care physicians functionally failed out of Med School, there will then be little reason not to lower standards. If Med School is made easier, more like, for example, Nursing School, you can expect to have enough primary care physicians, at lower cost, to handle the expanded demand.
There will, of course, sooner than later, be a dramatic shortage of specialists (with one notable exception). For that, the President and Congressional Democrats do have a straight forward, if somewhat copycat, plan: IBGYBG.
Sunday, October 11, 2009
The Nobel Prize
Yoni Brenner comments in the Times about the silliness of the award.
It seems to me that the politics would argue for Obama turning the award down. Let him say "I very much appreciate that you appreciate what I am trying to do, but I haven't done it yet and there are many deserving alternatives. Why don't we circle back in three years and see how I am doing?" Even his political opponents would have to credit him. By accepting the award he strengthens the narrative that sees him as seeing himself as the Obamessiah.
More distasteful than what Obama has not done and the deserving candidates passed over is Obama's track record. James Woolsey, CIA director under President Clinton, writes in the Journal, of the ugly premise underlying Obama's central Israel initiative: the ban on expanding kitchens in Gush Etsyon. Lanny Davis, former special counsel to President Clinton, recently observed in the Journal Obama's apparent intent to not "recognize free and fair elections in Honduras... at the same time it is about to recognize the president of Afghanistan, who was elected in what is now seen as a fraudulent electoral process." Add to that calibrated response to the violence in iran and his rebuff of the Dalai Lama and it seems that we have a president quite willing to trade freedom for stability.
The President, and his policy makers, argue that they are just being realistic; that their policies offer better outcomes. Which may prove out. But it does accentuate the perversity of extending this award to a man doggedly justifying means with ends, before the results are in.
It seems to me that the politics would argue for Obama turning the award down. Let him say "I very much appreciate that you appreciate what I am trying to do, but I haven't done it yet and there are many deserving alternatives. Why don't we circle back in three years and see how I am doing?" Even his political opponents would have to credit him. By accepting the award he strengthens the narrative that sees him as seeing himself as the Obamessiah.
More distasteful than what Obama has not done and the deserving candidates passed over is Obama's track record. James Woolsey, CIA director under President Clinton, writes in the Journal, of the ugly premise underlying Obama's central Israel initiative: the ban on expanding kitchens in Gush Etsyon. Lanny Davis, former special counsel to President Clinton, recently observed in the Journal Obama's apparent intent to not "recognize free and fair elections in Honduras... at the same time it is about to recognize the president of Afghanistan, who was elected in what is now seen as a fraudulent electoral process." Add to that calibrated response to the violence in iran and his rebuff of the Dalai Lama and it seems that we have a president quite willing to trade freedom for stability.
The President, and his policy makers, argue that they are just being realistic; that their policies offer better outcomes. Which may prove out. But it does accentuate the perversity of extending this award to a man doggedly justifying means with ends, before the results are in.
Thursday, October 8, 2009
Afghanistan
A few easy Afghan observations: Biden's proposed strategy for Afganistan sounds an awful lot like Rumsfeld's for Iraq. The Military, being protective of its institutional reputation, and more importantly, the lives of its soldiers, is less likely now, than it was then, to go more or less quietly along with a strategy it feels is dangerously wrong-headed. The administration, in claiming that military leaders who publicly express independent opinions are circumventing the chain of command, is, rather blatantly, attempting to circumvent its own chain of command by keeping key information -- professional military opinions -- from the public it, nominally, serves.
Listening to Candidate Obama, one sure got the impression that there was no meaningful difference between the Taliban and Al-Quaida. While Biden may well be correct that there still is, to the degree that Al-Quaida is primarily operating out of Pakistan, how helpful can focusing on Al-Quaida can be, without either Pakistani co-operation or disregard for Pakistani sovereignty? As the Taliban have been reported to be an extension of Pakistan's internal security service, the administration's sudden, and surprising, willingness to include the Taliban in the future of Afghanistan appears a carrot offered in the hopes of that co-operation.
Given the relative strategic priority, one imagines that the debate over Afghanistan policy is part of the larger effort regarding neighboring Iran. Iran, presumably, would strongly prefer the Biden plan. The administration might view this public airing as a useful support to its diplomacy (playing Good Cop to McChrystal's Bad Cop).
What ever the case, the Administration has, best one can tell, tried very hard to maintain a sophisticated, multi-faceted, diplomatic engagement with Iran. Since Reagan, Conservatives question the general effectiveness of that sort of approach. Obama, now, has a golden opportunity to prove them wrong.
Listening to Candidate Obama, one sure got the impression that there was no meaningful difference between the Taliban and Al-Quaida. While Biden may well be correct that there still is, to the degree that Al-Quaida is primarily operating out of Pakistan, how helpful can focusing on Al-Quaida can be, without either Pakistani co-operation or disregard for Pakistani sovereignty? As the Taliban have been reported to be an extension of Pakistan's internal security service, the administration's sudden, and surprising, willingness to include the Taliban in the future of Afghanistan appears a carrot offered in the hopes of that co-operation.
Given the relative strategic priority, one imagines that the debate over Afghanistan policy is part of the larger effort regarding neighboring Iran. Iran, presumably, would strongly prefer the Biden plan. The administration might view this public airing as a useful support to its diplomacy (playing Good Cop to McChrystal's Bad Cop).
What ever the case, the Administration has, best one can tell, tried very hard to maintain a sophisticated, multi-faceted, diplomatic engagement with Iran. Since Reagan, Conservatives question the general effectiveness of that sort of approach. Obama, now, has a golden opportunity to prove them wrong.
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
Serving the FDIC's Interest
In a recent speech, FDIC chair, Sheila Bair laid our her vision for financial services regulatory reform.
She starts from the common-sense premise that "we need an end to the too big to fail doctrine". She proposes a "mechanism for the orderly resolution of these institutions similar to that used for FDIC-insured banks." She argues for extending this mechanism beyond the large bank holding companies to smaller bank holding companies, hedge funds and insurance companies. She expressed support for the international initiative towards the development of wind down plans providing they "be developed in cooperation with the resolution authority". Finally, she also proposes considering "limiting the claims of secured creditors to encourage them to monitor the riskiness of the financial firm." She believes that short term secured borrowing "may encourage greater fragility in the financial markets" and that taking money from secured creditors and giving it to general creditors would serve "to stem any systemic risks."
The most striking feature of her analysis is that, to her, the "too big to fail doctrine" is false. That with a structured resolution process no firm is too big to fail. As noted previously, an FDIC-style resolution process works well when disposing a relatively tiny amount of assets into a large market. It can not be reasonably expected to work as well disposing a more meaningful proportion of assets in market.
That large and/or interconnected companies should maintain "living wills" is an almost inescapable take-away from the Lehman bankruptcy. Mandating that any such company (including non-financials) maintain active shareholder and creditor approved pre-packaged bankrupcy plans appears a no-brainer. Bair, rightfully, notes that such plans can improve systematic resilience by highlighting risks and dependencies. More questionable is her insistence on regulatory agency participation in, or rather -- let's not kid ourselves -- control of, developing these plans. Without regulator intervention, this sort of rule would create structural pressure against firms too big or complex to fail. The bigger and more complex a firm is, the more difficult it will be for shareholders and creditors, by themselves, to reach agreement.
Demanding that smaller firms that could be otherwise be reasonably wound down through existing mechanisms maintain "living wills", as Bair appears to support, is the sort of regulation-as-barrier-to-entry that larger firms love.
At first glance, her argument to mandate haircuts for secured creditors is unequivocally idiotic. If shareholders, regulators and unsecured creditors cannot together adequately monitor the riskiness of a firm, how could secured creditors? How does taking money from secured creditors and giving it to unsecured creditors stem any systemic risk?
Most risible is the suggestion that secured lending "encourages more risky behavior." Bair surely knows this is false: Systemic risk is primarily caused by unsecured rather than secured lending; A firm's secured borrowing cannot get out of hand, as a firm has finite assets to borrow against. If one only lends securely, one is not put at risk by a borrower defaulting. In truth, unsecured borrowing is also, generally, a check on excessively risky behavior as lenders demand higher rates from firms perceived as more risky. The financial system did not work this way because the government subsidized unsecured lending: In the first instance via the implicit "too-big-to-fail" guarantee, but also via the FDIC itself -- a bank account is nothing more then a unsecured loan to the bank.
Her true motivation appears clearer when one considers that the FDIC is running out of money. It would sure benefit from being able to seize 20% from secured creditors of banks it takes over. Similarly, to argue for an FDIC-like resolution process to be expansively applied is, between the lines, to argue for a dramatic expansion of FDIC authority. It should be no surprise that Bair argues as forcefully for regulation in her agency's interest as she opposed regulation against her agencies interest. It is unfortunate that the regulator cannot be relied on to, instead, defend the public interest.
She starts from the common-sense premise that "we need an end to the too big to fail doctrine". She proposes a "mechanism for the orderly resolution of these institutions similar to that used for FDIC-insured banks." She argues for extending this mechanism beyond the large bank holding companies to smaller bank holding companies, hedge funds and insurance companies. She expressed support for the international initiative towards the development of wind down plans providing they "be developed in cooperation with the resolution authority". Finally, she also proposes considering "limiting the claims of secured creditors to encourage them to monitor the riskiness of the financial firm." She believes that short term secured borrowing "may encourage greater fragility in the financial markets" and that taking money from secured creditors and giving it to general creditors would serve "to stem any systemic risks."
The most striking feature of her analysis is that, to her, the "too big to fail doctrine" is false. That with a structured resolution process no firm is too big to fail. As noted previously, an FDIC-style resolution process works well when disposing a relatively tiny amount of assets into a large market. It can not be reasonably expected to work as well disposing a more meaningful proportion of assets in market.
That large and/or interconnected companies should maintain "living wills" is an almost inescapable take-away from the Lehman bankruptcy. Mandating that any such company (including non-financials) maintain active shareholder and creditor approved pre-packaged bankrupcy plans appears a no-brainer. Bair, rightfully, notes that such plans can improve systematic resilience by highlighting risks and dependencies. More questionable is her insistence on regulatory agency participation in, or rather -- let's not kid ourselves -- control of, developing these plans. Without regulator intervention, this sort of rule would create structural pressure against firms too big or complex to fail. The bigger and more complex a firm is, the more difficult it will be for shareholders and creditors, by themselves, to reach agreement.
Demanding that smaller firms that could be otherwise be reasonably wound down through existing mechanisms maintain "living wills", as Bair appears to support, is the sort of regulation-as-barrier-to-entry that larger firms love.
At first glance, her argument to mandate haircuts for secured creditors is unequivocally idiotic. If shareholders, regulators and unsecured creditors cannot together adequately monitor the riskiness of a firm, how could secured creditors? How does taking money from secured creditors and giving it to unsecured creditors stem any systemic risk?
Most risible is the suggestion that secured lending "encourages more risky behavior." Bair surely knows this is false: Systemic risk is primarily caused by unsecured rather than secured lending; A firm's secured borrowing cannot get out of hand, as a firm has finite assets to borrow against. If one only lends securely, one is not put at risk by a borrower defaulting. In truth, unsecured borrowing is also, generally, a check on excessively risky behavior as lenders demand higher rates from firms perceived as more risky. The financial system did not work this way because the government subsidized unsecured lending: In the first instance via the implicit "too-big-to-fail" guarantee, but also via the FDIC itself -- a bank account is nothing more then a unsecured loan to the bank.
Her true motivation appears clearer when one considers that the FDIC is running out of money. It would sure benefit from being able to seize 20% from secured creditors of banks it takes over. Similarly, to argue for an FDIC-like resolution process to be expansively applied is, between the lines, to argue for a dramatic expansion of FDIC authority. It should be no surprise that Bair argues as forcefully for regulation in her agency's interest as she opposed regulation against her agencies interest. It is unfortunate that the regulator cannot be relied on to, instead, defend the public interest.
Tuesday, October 6, 2009
The Pursuit Of Ignorance
One of the not-enough-discussed culprits at the heart of our economic melt-down is a portfolio theory which promises that, through the miracle of diversification, smart investors need not trouble themselves with the messy details of any potential investment. This has quantitative problems that any competent investor would have tried to address. For example: correlations in bull markets can not be expected, with any certainty, to hold in bear markets, but given that our political and economic watchmen feel obliged to restrain bear markets, there is limited data available to derive more meaningful correlations. There is, however, no getting around the fundamental qualitative issue: So long as somebody is minding the store, diversification-investors can piggyback. The more investors adopt this approach, the fewer investors there are minding the store and the more executive decisions are made to benefit management or short term, vulture, investors.
This is, I think, an instance of a general pattern. Central Bankers, and their would-bes, looking mostly at coarse grained economic indicators feel comfortable directing whole economies. Regulators and Legislators -- not to speak of Journalists! -- are heroically unrestrained by an often for-dummies (if that) understanding of the industries they oversee. Our President has apparently adopted that theory of foreign relations which argues we need not bother understanding the internal political dynamic of other nations. In the middle of it all is a culture of management, in which everyone's highest professional aspiration is to take credit -- and be paid -- for other people's work.
In the end, the strength of an economy boils down to the aggregate willingness and ability of people to do things valued by other people. And underneath all the awful decisions made by all sorts of economic actors, lies a culture that increasingly devalues the painstaking work that goes with ordinary productivity.
This is, I think, an instance of a general pattern. Central Bankers, and their would-bes, looking mostly at coarse grained economic indicators feel comfortable directing whole economies. Regulators and Legislators -- not to speak of Journalists! -- are heroically unrestrained by an often for-dummies (if that) understanding of the industries they oversee. Our President has apparently adopted that theory of foreign relations which argues we need not bother understanding the internal political dynamic of other nations. In the middle of it all is a culture of management, in which everyone's highest professional aspiration is to take credit -- and be paid -- for other people's work.
In the end, the strength of an economy boils down to the aggregate willingness and ability of people to do things valued by other people. And underneath all the awful decisions made by all sorts of economic actors, lies a culture that increasingly devalues the painstaking work that goes with ordinary productivity.
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
Saving Regulation From Itself
The Times' Dealbook reports:
Theoretically, as the President outlined, this may entail such firms being subject to increased regulatory scrutiny to ensure they do not take undue risk. In practice, even this will not likely come to pass. It is unclear that such regulation would be, in any way, more onerous then that which smaller firms will be subject to in the name of filling gaps in the regulatory fabric. It is unclear that the politically influenced regulators will serve to dampen, rather than spur excessive risk taking. Finally, it is unclear with what degree of seriousness we can take anything the President said considering the as-a-given dismissive-ness, his senior economic adviser treated the declaration of intent, in the same speech, to "put an end to the idea that some firms are 'too big to fail'."
In that politically astute speech, the President captured the common sense lesson reasonable people took away from the credit melt down: Too big to fail is too big. Washington's regulatory class, apparently, learned the opposite lesson: Not too big to fail is not big enough.
This is a clarifying moment, as Republicans have no real ability to influence the outcome. If, as appears likely, the administration, under the banner of tighter regulation, uses the power of government to distort markets in the service of large Wall Street banks, Democrats will not be able to blame corrupted Republicans. Rather, it will demonstrate, as clearly as can be, corruption in the heart of the idea of regulation.
If the goal of the regulatory class is to protect capitalism from itself, who, or by what means, will they (and we!) be protected from themselves?
Paul A. Volcker, a top White House economic adviser... [and] former Federal Reserve chairman, told Congress that by designating some companies as critical to the broader financial system, the administration’s plans would create an expectation that those companies enjoy government backing in tough times...
He urged lawmakers to make clear that nonbank companies would not be saved with federal money... he took "as a given" that banks would be bailed out in times of crisis.Theoretically, as the President outlined, this may entail such firms being subject to increased regulatory scrutiny to ensure they do not take undue risk. In practice, even this will not likely come to pass. It is unclear that such regulation would be, in any way, more onerous then that which smaller firms will be subject to in the name of filling gaps in the regulatory fabric. It is unclear that the politically influenced regulators will serve to dampen, rather than spur excessive risk taking. Finally, it is unclear with what degree of seriousness we can take anything the President said considering the as-a-given dismissive-ness, his senior economic adviser treated the declaration of intent, in the same speech, to "put an end to the idea that some firms are 'too big to fail'."
In that politically astute speech, the President captured the common sense lesson reasonable people took away from the credit melt down: Too big to fail is too big. Washington's regulatory class, apparently, learned the opposite lesson: Not too big to fail is not big enough.
This is a clarifying moment, as Republicans have no real ability to influence the outcome. If, as appears likely, the administration, under the banner of tighter regulation, uses the power of government to distort markets in the service of large Wall Street banks, Democrats will not be able to blame corrupted Republicans. Rather, it will demonstrate, as clearly as can be, corruption in the heart of the idea of regulation.
If the goal of the regulatory class is to protect capitalism from itself, who, or by what means, will they (and we!) be protected from themselves?
Friday, September 25, 2009
Wall Street Compensation
Eric Dash blogging in the NY Times explains What’s Really Wrong With Wall Street Pay.
The easy observation that Wall Street compensation policies are unsustainably flawed does not at all support the current push for regulatorily controlled compensation.
Free markets, of course, feature a wonderfully elegant regulatory mechanism for dealing with firms unable to set interest-aligned and sustainable compensation policies: They go out of business. It is only in a regulatory-jungle system like ours, where the government dutifully insulates powerful firms from market discipline, that issues like this arise.
Time was when progressives could maintain the conceit that the idea of regulation was to protect the market from itself. As it stands, it is a barely disguised euphemism for command.
The easy observation that Wall Street compensation policies are unsustainably flawed does not at all support the current push for regulatorily controlled compensation.
Free markets, of course, feature a wonderfully elegant regulatory mechanism for dealing with firms unable to set interest-aligned and sustainable compensation policies: They go out of business. It is only in a regulatory-jungle system like ours, where the government dutifully insulates powerful firms from market discipline, that issues like this arise.
Time was when progressives could maintain the conceit that the idea of regulation was to protect the market from itself. As it stands, it is a barely disguised euphemism for command.
Sunday, September 20, 2009
Obama's America
There appears to be such a mountain of forensic evidence linking janitor Raymond Clark, III to the murder of medical student Annie Le, that authorities do not feel the need to lock down his motivation.
From the reporting it appears that achievement/class resentment was likely involved. The executive director of the American Association for Laboratory Animal Science has been quoted to the effect of: The gap in education levels shouldn't necessarily lead to tension if there is a culture of respect. The latent blaming-the-victim implication horrifies.
Von Hayek notes that envy, according to Mill the most evil of all passions, is sanctified in our society by the formula "social justice". What the successful once dismissed as envy on the part of the less successful is, in the view of the less successful -- or as we are obligated to see them: "less fortunate" -- righteous indignation in the face of gross injustice.
Even if we sympathize with the aspiration towards equality of opportunity and admire the charitable impulse, we must recognize that the equation of unfairness with injustice sits, precariously, on a slippery slope.
Overseen on a morning cross-town bus: suited father and pre-school daughter, perhaps 4 years old. Father and daughter are reviewing addition and subtraction on his fingers.
It is hardly fair that products of less invested parents will have to, one day, compete against that little girl. Just as it is hardly fair that people less naturally gifted have to, every day, compete against people more naturally gifted. Or that people with weak work ethic have to compete against those who seem to enjoy hard work.
A society in which parental investment, natural ability and hard work are more generally rewarded is one that will generally progress farther. A rising tide, in turn, lifts all ships. But try explaining that to Raymond Clark, III.
From the reporting it appears that achievement/class resentment was likely involved. The executive director of the American Association for Laboratory Animal Science has been quoted to the effect of: The gap in education levels shouldn't necessarily lead to tension if there is a culture of respect. The latent blaming-the-victim implication horrifies.
Von Hayek notes that envy, according to Mill the most evil of all passions, is sanctified in our society by the formula "social justice". What the successful once dismissed as envy on the part of the less successful is, in the view of the less successful -- or as we are obligated to see them: "less fortunate" -- righteous indignation in the face of gross injustice.
Even if we sympathize with the aspiration towards equality of opportunity and admire the charitable impulse, we must recognize that the equation of unfairness with injustice sits, precariously, on a slippery slope.
Overseen on a morning cross-town bus: suited father and pre-school daughter, perhaps 4 years old. Father and daughter are reviewing addition and subtraction on his fingers.
It is hardly fair that products of less invested parents will have to, one day, compete against that little girl. Just as it is hardly fair that people less naturally gifted have to, every day, compete against people more naturally gifted. Or that people with weak work ethic have to compete against those who seem to enjoy hard work.
A society in which parental investment, natural ability and hard work are more generally rewarded is one that will generally progress farther. A rising tide, in turn, lifts all ships. But try explaining that to Raymond Clark, III.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Racketeering
Drudge posted a report that public trust of media has fallen to record lows. It is unsurprising that an industry that sells -- above all -- trust suffers economically as it loses trust. On the other hand, perhaps trust is merely more diffuse. Media does increasingly market "Trust Us, Don't Trust Them."
One source of any loss of trust is that, as people receive information from multiple sources, slanted editing is readily apparent and, therefore, costly.
An example from yesterday's news: Reading the Times one is led to believe that the proposed BofA SEC settlement was thrown out of court over concerns about irresponsible management and overly lax regulation. Obama, according to the Times, is, of course, rushing to save the day by pushing for "tougher" regulation. Along the way the health care debate is mentioned and the gentle reader is informed of Obama appointee Mary Schapiro's heroic efforts to revive the SEC's "reputation as an effective watchdog of Wall Street."
The actual facts -- buried, mostly, in the bottom of the article -- are these: BofA was coerced by the Governments, as part of effort to stem the financial crisis, to purchase Merrill. The S.E.C. then turned around and sued BofA management claiming -- apparently with justice -- that it failed to adequately inform shareholders of pending Merrill bonuses. The parties agreed that BofA should pay $33M. The judge, above all noting the gross injustice of making the alleged victim -- BofA shareholders -- pay the penalty ripped the racketeers, both of whom profit from the arrangement (The S.E.C. by getting to claim that it is exposing wrongdoing). A dozen lines up from the bottom, the article notes that screwing shareholders in this manner (perhaps, amongst others) is a long-standing S.E.C. practice.
The readily apparent takeaway: The Judge’s issue was with an until-now-unchecked, out-of-control, regulator abusing the people it was charged with protecting; the precise opposite of the "overly-lax regulator" trip the Times tried to sell.
More accurate reporting of the decision is available from this WSJ op-ed.
One source of any loss of trust is that, as people receive information from multiple sources, slanted editing is readily apparent and, therefore, costly.
An example from yesterday's news: Reading the Times one is led to believe that the proposed BofA SEC settlement was thrown out of court over concerns about irresponsible management and overly lax regulation. Obama, according to the Times, is, of course, rushing to save the day by pushing for "tougher" regulation. Along the way the health care debate is mentioned and the gentle reader is informed of Obama appointee Mary Schapiro's heroic efforts to revive the SEC's "reputation as an effective watchdog of Wall Street."
The actual facts -- buried, mostly, in the bottom of the article -- are these: BofA was coerced by the Governments, as part of effort to stem the financial crisis, to purchase Merrill. The S.E.C. then turned around and sued BofA management claiming -- apparently with justice -- that it failed to adequately inform shareholders of pending Merrill bonuses. The parties agreed that BofA should pay $33M. The judge, above all noting the gross injustice of making the alleged victim -- BofA shareholders -- pay the penalty ripped the racketeers, both of whom profit from the arrangement (The S.E.C. by getting to claim that it is exposing wrongdoing). A dozen lines up from the bottom, the article notes that screwing shareholders in this manner (perhaps, amongst others) is a long-standing S.E.C. practice.
The readily apparent takeaway: The Judge’s issue was with an until-now-unchecked, out-of-control, regulator abusing the people it was charged with protecting; the precise opposite of the "overly-lax regulator" trip the Times tried to sell.
More accurate reporting of the decision is available from this WSJ op-ed.
Sunday, September 6, 2009
Babies With Candy (or Baby Sitting on Capitol Hill)
The heart of Krugman's Times Magazine article is a cute"parable" about the Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-Op, first recounted in a 1977 article:
To Krugman's perverse view, we are always in a recession as there is never enough demand for -- to take an example -- Princeton Economics Proffessors or New York Times Columnists to provide jobs for everyone who wants one. More sensibly viewed: The problem was that people went out less then they otherwise might have.
Reading the actual 1977 article, it is evident that Krugman, for his purposes, misrepresents crucial detail:
The key to this whole thing is the silliness of the scheme. The scrip served no earthly good. There is no advantage to a couple babysitting for scrip to spend on babysitting over babysitting for dollars to spend on babysitting. The value the co-op created by establishing a babysitting exchange was impaired by the demand any transaction be in the heavily regulated scrip rather than dollars.
This was, in other words, a market designed to fail by regulators who didn't believe in markets. The primary lesson of this parable is the opposite of what Krugman would have his readers believe.
There is, to my mind, a more interesting take away from the observation that given the silliness of the scheme, there was an anti-market selection bias amongst people choosing to participate. More enterprising people may well have created a black market for scrip in which prices varied with changing supply and demand, saving the co-op from itself.
If this can be applied more broadly, it would argue that a foolishly regulated market economy (and, frankly, which isn't?) depends on a market-oriented culture to function well. In such an economy, market dysfunction can be caused by cultural change.
This co-op... was an association of about 150 young couples who agreed to help one another by baby-sitting... To ensure that every couple did its fair share of baby-sitting, the co-op introduced a form of scrip: coupons... entitling the bearer to one half-hour of sitting time. Initially, members received 20 coupons on joining and were required to return the same amount on departing the group.
Unfortunately, it turned out that the co-op’s members, on average, wanted to hold a reserve of more than 20 coupons, perhaps, in case they should want to go out several times in a row. As a result, relatively few people wanted to spend their scrip and go out, while many wanted to baby-sit so they could add to their hoard. But since baby-sitting opportunities arise only when someone goes out for the night, this meant that baby-sitting jobs were hard to find, which made members of the co-op even more reluctant to go out, making baby-sitting jobs even scarcer. . . .
[in] this particular example... a recession is a problem of inadequate demand — there isn’t enough demand for baby-sitting to provide jobs for everyone who wants one...
Freshwater economists... believe that all worthwhile economic analysis starts from the premise that people are rational and markets work, a premise violated by the story of the baby-sitting co-op. As they see it, a general lack of sufficient demand isn’t possible, because prices always move to match supply with demand.To Krugman's perverse view, we are always in a recession as there is never enough demand for -- to take an example -- Princeton Economics Proffessors or New York Times Columnists to provide jobs for everyone who wants one. More sensibly viewed: The problem was that people went out less then they otherwise might have.
Reading the actual 1977 article, it is evident that Krugman, for his purposes, misrepresents crucial detail:
- The price of the scrip was constitutionally pegged to one half-hour of sitting time.
- According to the authors the shortage of scrip did not stem from irrational fears of co-op members. Rather there was an ill thought out co-op management regime which removed about 5% of scrip from circulation annually.
- The co-op first attempted a rule mandating that members go out more. When this failed, they adjusted the rules such that new members received 30 scrip but only had to pay 20 on exit. According to the authors this worked for a while but eventually resulted in the reverse problem where more people wanted to go out than babysit.
The key to this whole thing is the silliness of the scheme. The scrip served no earthly good. There is no advantage to a couple babysitting for scrip to spend on babysitting over babysitting for dollars to spend on babysitting. The value the co-op created by establishing a babysitting exchange was impaired by the demand any transaction be in the heavily regulated scrip rather than dollars.
This was, in other words, a market designed to fail by regulators who didn't believe in markets. The primary lesson of this parable is the opposite of what Krugman would have his readers believe.
There is, to my mind, a more interesting take away from the observation that given the silliness of the scheme, there was an anti-market selection bias amongst people choosing to participate. More enterprising people may well have created a black market for scrip in which prices varied with changing supply and demand, saving the co-op from itself.
If this can be applied more broadly, it would argue that a foolishly regulated market economy (and, frankly, which isn't?) depends on a market-oriented culture to function well. In such an economy, market dysfunction can be caused by cultural change.
Saturday, September 5, 2009
Babies with Candy
If Paul Krugman is, indeed, a brilliant and rigorous thinker, he hides it awfully well. In a Times Magazine article he divides the world into two sort of economists. Freshwater economists believe markets are always perfect and workers choose not to work during recessions. Saltwater economists believe that markets are deeply flawed and require strong government participation to function well. He demonstrates the superior wisdom of the Saltwaters by the existence of bubbles, the fact that workers do not choose to be unemployment during a recession and the greater prestige of their affiliations (Harvard, MIT, Princeton).
Somebody in Krugman's prestigious university should explain him what a logical fallacy is.
It is very easy to argue that markets can mis-price things, or that recessions produce more than creative destruction; It is much more difficult to demonstrate that governments will generally, or even often, price things better or that fiscal policy will generally, or even often, does more good than harm. There is very little basis -- particularly in the context of the current financial crisis -- to believe that government can generally be expected to act more rationally then investors or consumers. On the contrary...
Krugman's beef, above all is with the theory of rational markets:
To Krugman, this argues for increased governmental babysitting of the economy.
It is hard to see, as Krugman does, in the failure of our heavily regulated financial markets, proof that ungoverned free markets fail. Or that what our financial markets require is more, not less, heavy handed government meddling.
In the end, it ought be stated, Krugman's line of argument is inherently anti-democratic. In a democratic government, limitations of individual economic decision making will be reflected in governmental decision making. There is no reason to believe that government -- riddled with agency cost, sitting on top of the food chain -- is not itself an institution at particularly high risk of running amok.
The belief that government can somehow stand above the fray, making rational and beneficial decisions, even as irrationality infects the hoi polloi, requires belief in a government that is something other then of and by the governed.
Somebody in Krugman's prestigious university should explain him what a logical fallacy is.
It is very easy to argue that markets can mis-price things, or that recessions produce more than creative destruction; It is much more difficult to demonstrate that governments will generally, or even often, price things better or that fiscal policy will generally, or even often, does more good than harm. There is very little basis -- particularly in the context of the current financial crisis -- to believe that government can generally be expected to act more rationally then investors or consumers. On the contrary...
Krugman's beef, above all is with the theory of rational markets:
As I see it, the economics profession went astray because economists... fell back in love with the old, idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact in perfect markets...
Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of markets — especially financial markets...
To Krugman, this argues for increased governmental babysitting of the economy.
It is hard to see, as Krugman does, in the failure of our heavily regulated financial markets, proof that ungoverned free markets fail. Or that what our financial markets require is more, not less, heavy handed government meddling.
In the end, it ought be stated, Krugman's line of argument is inherently anti-democratic. In a democratic government, limitations of individual economic decision making will be reflected in governmental decision making. There is no reason to believe that government -- riddled with agency cost, sitting on top of the food chain -- is not itself an institution at particularly high risk of running amok.
The belief that government can somehow stand above the fray, making rational and beneficial decisions, even as irrationality infects the hoi polloi, requires belief in a government that is something other then of and by the governed.
Tuesday, September 1, 2009
Government Re-Insurance
The FDIC appears close to insolvency. This comes on the heels of the insolvency of Fannie Mae + Freddie Mac, and with that of the PBGC, Medicare, Social Security and, many suspect, the FHA, looming on the horizon. There are, of course, no shortages of private sector bankruptcies in the current disrupted economy, but there are good structural reasons to question whether a democratic government can be expected to well manage an insurance program.
The fundamental problem is the asymmetric interest and information involved in such a program. Groups paying premiums have will lobby as hard as they can to reduce their payments far below any risk adjusted fair value. Tax payers, less likely to be aware of the down-the-line costs-to-them politically reduced premiums are likely to bring, will not exert meaningful countervailing pressure. Political decision makers will grease the squeaky wheel.
The general hybrid regime we have of nominally private sector insurance, heavily regulated and implicitly backstopped by the government works reasonably well. Structurally, it creates an interest group able to check political power of premium payers and markets within which risk can be, more or less, priced.
On the other hand, the complexity of the hybrid econo-system reduces cost transparency and accountability. For example, if medical insurance companies were regulatory required to take on previously uninsured sick people at the same price they take on healthy people, insurers would raise rates on everyone. Customers would have general difficulty attributing cause, especially as there would be politicians and affiliated media arguing that the rate increases were due to private "waste" or "greed". A hybrid insurance system, whether or not it effectively produces a public good, is also vulnerable politically to the charge of "socialized risk, private profit." Given a byzantine regulatory framework precludes a reasonably competitive market, its easy to imagine insurers take more than market profit.
In short, the current hybrid system has the advantage of a market for price discovery, but suffers from having too many chefs in the kitchen.
The difficulty with a purely private approach for key forms of insurance is removing the implicit government backstop. If, for example, a life insurer of any reasonable size failed, the politics would tend towards a bailout for beneficiaries. Its hard to imagine how a insurance market could well function without any insurers of reasonable size.
The least bad approach might be "publically provided, privately priced". To take a "Public Option" as an example, such a system could work roughly along the following lines: The Insuring Agency sets its policies as far as what it pays for what and what premiums it charges. The Agency issues "re-insurance" securities with a moderate duration, perhaps three years. In the event the Agency ran out of premium money, holders would pay in the notional value of their securities before a government bailout. In exchange they are paid a fixed monthly rate.
It would not be to difficult to construct a reasonable feedback mechanism. For example requiring the agency sell a certain amount of new "re-insurance" securities in an annual all-or-nothing auction within a set price band. An auction failure -- indicating a lack of market confidence in the Agency's solvency over the three year window -- would trigger mandated steps -- reducing benefits, raising premiums, federal cash infusion -- to restore fiscal health established by a successful auction.
There is, of course, devil in these details. As a general principal, it is hard to imagine our Government creating a market that serves a purpose other than funneling taxpayer dollars to Government/Sachs. More concretely, it is easy to imagine that the Government will motivate the heavily regulated large players to dampen any negative market signals.
The fundamental problem is the asymmetric interest and information involved in such a program. Groups paying premiums have will lobby as hard as they can to reduce their payments far below any risk adjusted fair value. Tax payers, less likely to be aware of the down-the-line costs-to-them politically reduced premiums are likely to bring, will not exert meaningful countervailing pressure. Political decision makers will grease the squeaky wheel.
The general hybrid regime we have of nominally private sector insurance, heavily regulated and implicitly backstopped by the government works reasonably well. Structurally, it creates an interest group able to check political power of premium payers and markets within which risk can be, more or less, priced.
On the other hand, the complexity of the hybrid econo-system reduces cost transparency and accountability. For example, if medical insurance companies were regulatory required to take on previously uninsured sick people at the same price they take on healthy people, insurers would raise rates on everyone. Customers would have general difficulty attributing cause, especially as there would be politicians and affiliated media arguing that the rate increases were due to private "waste" or "greed". A hybrid insurance system, whether or not it effectively produces a public good, is also vulnerable politically to the charge of "socialized risk, private profit." Given a byzantine regulatory framework precludes a reasonably competitive market, its easy to imagine insurers take more than market profit.
In short, the current hybrid system has the advantage of a market for price discovery, but suffers from having too many chefs in the kitchen.
The difficulty with a purely private approach for key forms of insurance is removing the implicit government backstop. If, for example, a life insurer of any reasonable size failed, the politics would tend towards a bailout for beneficiaries. Its hard to imagine how a insurance market could well function without any insurers of reasonable size.
The least bad approach might be "publically provided, privately priced". To take a "Public Option" as an example, such a system could work roughly along the following lines: The Insuring Agency sets its policies as far as what it pays for what and what premiums it charges. The Agency issues "re-insurance" securities with a moderate duration, perhaps three years. In the event the Agency ran out of premium money, holders would pay in the notional value of their securities before a government bailout. In exchange they are paid a fixed monthly rate.
It would not be to difficult to construct a reasonable feedback mechanism. For example requiring the agency sell a certain amount of new "re-insurance" securities in an annual all-or-nothing auction within a set price band. An auction failure -- indicating a lack of market confidence in the Agency's solvency over the three year window -- would trigger mandated steps -- reducing benefits, raising premiums, federal cash infusion -- to restore fiscal health established by a successful auction.
There is, of course, devil in these details. As a general principal, it is hard to imagine our Government creating a market that serves a purpose other than funneling taxpayer dollars to Government/Sachs. More concretely, it is easy to imagine that the Government will motivate the heavily regulated large players to dampen any negative market signals.
Thursday, August 27, 2009
Teddy's Health Care
My gut reaction to Teddy's passing was unsympathetic. He was a man who, in both his personal and political life, was a bulwark against individual responsibility and accountability. For all his power and influence, his actual achievements were limited. To call someone a Lion of the Senate, is to damn with faint praise.
On the other hand, writing in the Journal, Noonan captures what was great and compelling and fundementally American about Kennedy, even for those repulsed by his political idealogy. Un-, or rather, very softly-, spoken in her column is an implicit compare and contrast extremely unfavorable to our current President.
Another, Journal op-ed reminds us that it wasn't long ago that pro-business conservatives were on the Government Health Care bandwagon, and, so, how badly the Administration has played what once was a winning hand.
The attempt to rebrand Universal Health Insurance as TeddyCare is of conflicting value. On one hand, it may make legislation more palatable to seniors. On the other hand, it risks serious backlash. As the Times delicately reported:
Voters can be expected to resent that Teddy, for his own care, ignored the evidence-driven medical care, we are being told he made the cause of his life to impose on others.
On the other hand, writing in the Journal, Noonan captures what was great and compelling and fundementally American about Kennedy, even for those repulsed by his political idealogy. Un-, or rather, very softly-, spoken in her column is an implicit compare and contrast extremely unfavorable to our current President.
Another, Journal op-ed reminds us that it wasn't long ago that pro-business conservatives were on the Government Health Care bandwagon, and, so, how badly the Administration has played what once was a winning hand.
The attempt to rebrand Universal Health Insurance as TeddyCare is of conflicting value. On one hand, it may make legislation more palatable to seniors. On the other hand, it risks serious backlash. As the Times delicately reported:
...He chose what he called “prudently aggressive” treatments.
“He always admired people who took risks, like Teddy and Kara did,” Mr. Dodd said, referring to two of Mr. Kennedy’s children, who both beat cancer with bold treatments...
Mr. Kennedy deputized Dr. Horowitz, who lives in the San Francisco Bay Area, to research all treatment options before deciding on an intensive regimen of surgery, chemotherapy and radiation — hardly a clear-cut choice with an almost inevitably lethal disease and a patient of Mr. Kennedy’s age. Some physicians assembled at Massachusetts General Hospital considered his tumor inoperable — and measured his likely survival time between six weeks and a few months.Voters can be expected to resent that Teddy, for his own care, ignored the evidence-driven medical care, we are being told he made the cause of his life to impose on others.
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Smart Diplomacy
Amongst the campaign promises the President has had difficult living up to was his commitment to smart diplomacy.
If this Drudge post is accurate, he appears about to, in his own way, deliver.
The gist of the four way deal is the US takes a much harsher line on Iran, in particular the promise of meaningful sanctions, Israel agrees to a very limited -- basically in name only -- settlement freeze, Arab states agree to very limited moves towards normalization, Palestinians agree to resume stalled negotiations.
According to the article, both Israel and the Arab States are primarily motivated by a desire to see the current administration grow a pair vis a vis Iran, it is less clear why the Palestinians agreed to play along. The promised shift in Obama's Iran policy is, in fact, the only real commitment in this whole deal. There is no indication of a genuine diplomatic breakthrough between Israel and the Palestinians that might lead to an actual agreement.
In the end, a skeptic might wonder if all this window dressing is entirely for the benefit of allowing our Government to save face as it drops a failing approach. More practically, perhaps the President felt he required the mirage of peace process progress to sell a more aggressive policy towards Iran to his core supporters.
Netanyahu is, perhaps, the biggest political winner. Israelis -- even those who generally oppose settlement construction -- being less aware of American domestic political calculations, will see this deal as being very well bargained by their Prime Minister.
If this Drudge post is accurate, he appears about to, in his own way, deliver.
The gist of the four way deal is the US takes a much harsher line on Iran, in particular the promise of meaningful sanctions, Israel agrees to a very limited -- basically in name only -- settlement freeze, Arab states agree to very limited moves towards normalization, Palestinians agree to resume stalled negotiations.
According to the article, both Israel and the Arab States are primarily motivated by a desire to see the current administration grow a pair vis a vis Iran, it is less clear why the Palestinians agreed to play along. The promised shift in Obama's Iran policy is, in fact, the only real commitment in this whole deal. There is no indication of a genuine diplomatic breakthrough between Israel and the Palestinians that might lead to an actual agreement.
In the end, a skeptic might wonder if all this window dressing is entirely for the benefit of allowing our Government to save face as it drops a failing approach. More practically, perhaps the President felt he required the mirage of peace process progress to sell a more aggressive policy towards Iran to his core supporters.
Netanyahu is, perhaps, the biggest political winner. Israelis -- even those who generally oppose settlement construction -- being less aware of American domestic political calculations, will see this deal as being very well bargained by their Prime Minister.
Saturday, August 22, 2009
Texas
It is obviously very early, but of prospective GOP 2012 Presidential candidates, Rick Perry has the best story. He is a rock solid conservative, who said no to stimulus money, governs the best state economy and is more telegenic than Bobby Jindal.
His path to the presidency, however, goes through fellow Republican Kay Bailey Hutchison, who is challenging him in the primary for the 2010 gubernatorial election.
This primary well serves republican interests. Perry seems likely to emerge victorious, more battle tested and so more prepared for the 2012 elections. If he proves unable, better to find that out in 2010 then 2012.
His path to the presidency, however, goes through fellow Republican Kay Bailey Hutchison, who is challenging him in the primary for the 2010 gubernatorial election.
This primary well serves republican interests. Perry seems likely to emerge victorious, more battle tested and so more prepared for the 2012 elections. If he proves unable, better to find that out in 2010 then 2012.
Friday, August 21, 2009
A Wonderful Suggestion
A Times op-ed reports that Rhode Island plans a new law requiring health insurance policies be written such that the average person can understand them.
This sounds like a wonderful idea whose utility is not limited to health insurance policies. If only financial derivative contracts had been required to be written that way! Or, more importantly, the Health Care Bill.
This sounds like a wonderful idea whose utility is not limited to health insurance policies. If only financial derivative contracts had been required to be written that way! Or, more importantly, the Health Care Bill.
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Income Inequality
A NY Times article quotes a Harvard economist who makes an almost entirely reasonable argument:
It is certainly true that income disparity creates serious issues in our society. In particular -- as he notes -- the wealthy have a greater ability to bend government policy towards their economic interests. His latter two examples of such bending, however, are foolish.
The charts included in the article demonstrate that increases in the highest incomes do not lead to tax cuts. (Perhaps one of his students can explain him how to run a regression... )
Secondly, he repeats the oft-heard, but couldn't-be-farther-from-the-truth, cant that Wall Street excess was enabled by "weak" financial regulation. In the context of his argument it is more thoughtless than usual. If the wealthy are able to bend government policy to their interest, why would they modestly settle for weak regulation, when they could get regulation that more affirmatively served their interest? (Do they really call it Government Sachs for nothing?) And as he understands that the wealthy strongly influence government policy, how can he take for granted that strong regulation would, in any way, work against their interest?
On a related topic, one Ronald Dworkin (no, not that one) argues in the journal that the upper middle class today is more responsive to marginal disincentives to work then it was in the past, as work is less considered itself a virtue and professionals are increasingly swayed by quality of life concerns.
His argument strengthened another argument that has been bubbling in the back of my head: Progressive taxation increases income disparity. To construct a crude model -- a company with $100 revenue and two employees, one highly silled ("A") making $66 and one not ("B") making $34. If both are taxed at 33%, A takes home $44. If taxes are changed such that A pays 50%, her take home would initially be reduced to $33. A's natural response would be to ask for a $22 raise to restore her take home value. Any raise for her comes out of B's pocket. If A recieves half her request, she is now making $77 and B $23. The increased tax progressiveness producing an increase in income disparity.
This is a rough model by any stretch, but its core contention is strengthened by the argument that A will meaningfully reduce her hours in response to a meaningful reduction in her after-tax wage. In theory, the company could hire an additional person to share A's role. In practice, it will often be more cost effective to pay A more.
"I think incredibly high incomes can have a pernicious effect on the polity and the economy,"... Much of the growth of high-end incomes stemmed from market forces, like technological innovation... But a significant amount also stemmed from the wealthy’s newfound ability to win favorable government contracts, low tax rates and weak financial regulation, he added.It is certainly true that income disparity creates serious issues in our society. In particular -- as he notes -- the wealthy have a greater ability to bend government policy towards their economic interests. His latter two examples of such bending, however, are foolish.
The charts included in the article demonstrate that increases in the highest incomes do not lead to tax cuts. (Perhaps one of his students can explain him how to run a regression... )
Secondly, he repeats the oft-heard, but couldn't-be-farther-from-the-truth, cant that Wall Street excess was enabled by "weak" financial regulation. In the context of his argument it is more thoughtless than usual. If the wealthy are able to bend government policy to their interest, why would they modestly settle for weak regulation, when they could get regulation that more affirmatively served their interest? (Do they really call it Government Sachs for nothing?) And as he understands that the wealthy strongly influence government policy, how can he take for granted that strong regulation would, in any way, work against their interest?
On a related topic, one Ronald Dworkin (no, not that one) argues in the journal that the upper middle class today is more responsive to marginal disincentives to work then it was in the past, as work is less considered itself a virtue and professionals are increasingly swayed by quality of life concerns.
His argument strengthened another argument that has been bubbling in the back of my head: Progressive taxation increases income disparity. To construct a crude model -- a company with $100 revenue and two employees, one highly silled ("A") making $66 and one not ("B") making $34. If both are taxed at 33%, A takes home $44. If taxes are changed such that A pays 50%, her take home would initially be reduced to $33. A's natural response would be to ask for a $22 raise to restore her take home value. Any raise for her comes out of B's pocket. If A recieves half her request, she is now making $77 and B $23. The increased tax progressiveness producing an increase in income disparity.
This is a rough model by any stretch, but its core contention is strengthened by the argument that A will meaningfully reduce her hours in response to a meaningful reduction in her after-tax wage. In theory, the company could hire an additional person to share A's role. In practice, it will often be more cost effective to pay A more.
Sunday, August 16, 2009
IoC
As I am moving from Java to DotNet, i am re-evaluating IoC containers.
I've been naively using Spring for a while, and unfortunately, missed out on Guice, which, best I can tell is the IoC of my dreams (now lost to me forever, or at least as long as I am on DotNet).
That said, I am growing skeptical of the concept of an IoC container. To take an example from the Guice site. Is this:
The primary differences -- best I can tell -- are:
I've been naively using Spring for a while, and unfortunately, missed out on Guice, which, best I can tell is the IoC of my dreams (now lost to me forever, or at least as long as I am on DotNet).
That said, I am growing skeptical of the concept of an IoC container. To take an example from the Guice site. Is this:
public class BillingModule extends AbstractModule {
@Override
protected void configure() {
bind(TransactionLog.class).to(DatabaseTransactionLog.class);
bind(CreditCardProcessor.class).to(PaypalCreditCardProcessor.class);
bind(BillingService.class).to(RealBillingService.class);
}
}Really so much more awesome than: public static void main(String[] args) {
CreditCardProcessor processor = new PaypalCreditCardProcessor();
TransactionLog transactionLog = new DatabaseTransactionLog();
BillingService billingService
= new RealBillingService(creditCardProcessor, transactionLog);
...
}?The primary differences -- best I can tell -- are:
- Without an IoC container, every class ideally announces every dependency via its constructor. This can result in a lot of constructors requiring, e.g.: Loggers, which is, arguably, displeasing aesthetically. This also may not work smoothly with tools that want a no-arg constructor.
- If your object graph changes, w/o the IoC container, you'd have to change constructors forcing changes to your wiring code before you could compile. With an IoC container, things can, but are not guaranteed, to adapt more magically. You may not be notified that your code is now broken until it fails in run-time.
Friday, August 14, 2009
SSIS != ETL
I've started to use Microsoft Sql Server Integration Services @ work. On first impression, like many ms products: its purty.
The second impression is less favorable. An ETL tool has two by-definition requirements: The E-L, pulling data from some source(s) and pushing it to some target(s), and the T, meaningful transformations of the data.
SSIS does a service-able job at the E-L. Which is, by itself, no win. DTS, once upon a time also did, and SSIS leverages already existing Microsoft Technologies to do most of the work.
As far as the T goes, SSIS is, at best adequate. Relatively basic and common tasks are difficult even, if, more or less do-able.
The over-arching issue for SSIS is there is little reason to use it. As there are plenty of tools out there providing data transfer between heterogeneous sources, an ETL tool has to provide a reason to embed transformation logic in its platform instead of natively in database procedures, which, for me, SSIS, so far, fails to do:
As it exists, I suspect the best way to make it useful is to build some template packages, an internal (xml) package definition configuration file and dotnet code which programmatically builds packages, which entails an awfully high start up cost. In my current implementation I am limiting my use of SSIS, mostly, to its E-L ability, and, for the moment, as a stored procedure runner.
In the end, of course, it is unfair to hold to basically free SSIS to the bar set by far more expensive alternative tools.
The second impression is less favorable. An ETL tool has two by-definition requirements: The E-L, pulling data from some source(s) and pushing it to some target(s), and the T, meaningful transformations of the data.
SSIS does a service-able job at the E-L. Which is, by itself, no win. DTS, once upon a time also did, and SSIS leverages already existing Microsoft Technologies to do most of the work.
As far as the T goes, SSIS is, at best adequate. Relatively basic and common tasks are difficult even, if, more or less do-able.
The over-arching issue for SSIS is there is little reason to use it. As there are plenty of tools out there providing data transfer between heterogeneous sources, an ETL tool has to provide a reason to embed transformation logic in its platform instead of natively in database procedures, which, for me, SSIS, so far, fails to do:
- A firm seeking database vendor independence wouldn't choose SQL Server Integration Services.
- An ETL developer requiring drag and drop GUIs (and so, unable to code procedures) likely lacks the ability to handle reasonable complicated transformation logic.
- SSIS does not, yet, provide useful few-click implementations of common ETL tasks. For example, while it has a SCD transformation, I've found it does not always behave as one, or at least I, would like. Or, more egregiously: the nightmare that is the pivot transformation.
- Finally, the most frustrating to me is that, at the very least, I expect an ETL tool to give me robust logging and auditing reasonably free. If I write a stored procedure, I have to manually intermingle code capturing and loggic basic metadata (e.g.: How many rows were retrieved from a source, how many were inserted into the various destinations) with my transformation logic. An ETL tool can capture and log that behind the scenes. What makes SSIS' failure in this regard completely fustrating is that MicroSoft understands, exactly the sort of logging a real world project would desire and how clunky and intrusive it is to implement in SSIS.
As it exists, I suspect the best way to make it useful is to build some template packages, an internal (xml) package definition configuration file and dotnet code which programmatically builds packages, which entails an awfully high start up cost. In my current implementation I am limiting my use of SSIS, mostly, to its E-L ability, and, for the moment, as a stored procedure runner.
In the end, of course, it is unfair to hold to basically free SSIS to the bar set by far more expensive alternative tools.
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Systemic Risk
The WSJ reports that dems seek to regulate VCs out of fear that Hedge Funds might otherwise avoid the yoke of regulation by labelling themselves VCs. Hedge Funds, of course, must be regulated in the name of "Systemic Risk". As a stress tested matter of fact, they actually pose little such.
The most common notion of systemic risk is: the risks imposed by interdependencies in a system/market, where the failure of a single entity can bring down the entire system/market.
This is simply not true of most Hedge Funds. There have been many notable blow-ups with only one -- LTCM -- raising the spectre of systemic risk. And, as described in a previous post, in any reasonable frame, the systemic risk posed by the LTCM collapse had far more to do with reckless (despite being regulated) banks then the fund. In the current crisis, while Hedge Funds are hemorrhaging capital, only those owned by banks have received Government support.
As a software developer, I tend to see systemic risk, in the sense above, as one type of, for lack of a better term: "structural risk". By which I mean: bad architecture; A system designed, or structured, in such a way that it will more often than not produce bad outcomes.
To take an example from my undergrad EE, imagine a chain of Christmas lights designed such that if any one bulb died, all bulbs follow. Such a chain would not long last. Re-architecting the chain to decouple a bulb's life from its neighbor's would be a far more sensible strategy then adding intrusive and expansive monitoring and micro-control on top of the flawed design. Which, if you are following the analogy, is what financial regulators -- eschewing the simpler "too big to fail is too big" -- seem to have in mind.
Large public banks fundementally pose "Structural Risk" in that their behavior is dominated by agency costs. Public shareholders are almost guarranteed to be absent and incapable owners. Banks are not subject to meaningful market discipline (which would be a structural check on agency risk) both because (a) their biggest clients are large institutional investors (eg: pension funds) who themselves personify agency risk and FDIC insured account holders who, as such, are more concerned with cheap promotions then sound operation, and (b) being too big to fail they operate in the market with implicit Government guarrantees. Given this environment, large public banks can be expected to, more often then not, behave irresponsibly. This is not true of most Hedge Funds which tend to be managed by expert owners, with, historically, wealthy individual or family office clients and, of course, no Government backstop.
Which is all to say that, while it is reasonable to tightly regulate exceptionally large funds, funds owned by banks and funds who manage a meaningful amount of institutional money, there is little reason to regulate most funds. The push for unnecessarily expansive regulation is especially unseemly given the far weaker push for meaningfully re-designing regulation controlling those companies most directly responsible for the current mess -- Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the credit rating agencies, the large banks, etc -- all of whose behavior was strongly influenced by existing regulation.
A cynic might note that more regulated companies make better donors and are more responsive to the desires of government officials. Perhaps the ultimate structural risk is having racketeers at the top of the food chain.
The most common notion of systemic risk is: the risks imposed by interdependencies in a system/market, where the failure of a single entity can bring down the entire system/market.
This is simply not true of most Hedge Funds. There have been many notable blow-ups with only one -- LTCM -- raising the spectre of systemic risk. And, as described in a previous post, in any reasonable frame, the systemic risk posed by the LTCM collapse had far more to do with reckless (despite being regulated) banks then the fund. In the current crisis, while Hedge Funds are hemorrhaging capital, only those owned by banks have received Government support.
As a software developer, I tend to see systemic risk, in the sense above, as one type of, for lack of a better term: "structural risk". By which I mean: bad architecture; A system designed, or structured, in such a way that it will more often than not produce bad outcomes.
To take an example from my undergrad EE, imagine a chain of Christmas lights designed such that if any one bulb died, all bulbs follow. Such a chain would not long last. Re-architecting the chain to decouple a bulb's life from its neighbor's would be a far more sensible strategy then adding intrusive and expansive monitoring and micro-control on top of the flawed design. Which, if you are following the analogy, is what financial regulators -- eschewing the simpler "too big to fail is too big" -- seem to have in mind.
Large public banks fundementally pose "Structural Risk" in that their behavior is dominated by agency costs. Public shareholders are almost guarranteed to be absent and incapable owners. Banks are not subject to meaningful market discipline (which would be a structural check on agency risk) both because (a) their biggest clients are large institutional investors (eg: pension funds) who themselves personify agency risk and FDIC insured account holders who, as such, are more concerned with cheap promotions then sound operation, and (b) being too big to fail they operate in the market with implicit Government guarrantees. Given this environment, large public banks can be expected to, more often then not, behave irresponsibly. This is not true of most Hedge Funds which tend to be managed by expert owners, with, historically, wealthy individual or family office clients and, of course, no Government backstop.
Which is all to say that, while it is reasonable to tightly regulate exceptionally large funds, funds owned by banks and funds who manage a meaningful amount of institutional money, there is little reason to regulate most funds. The push for unnecessarily expansive regulation is especially unseemly given the far weaker push for meaningfully re-designing regulation controlling those companies most directly responsible for the current mess -- Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the credit rating agencies, the large banks, etc -- all of whose behavior was strongly influenced by existing regulation.
A cynic might note that more regulated companies make better donors and are more responsive to the desires of government officials. Perhaps the ultimate structural risk is having racketeers at the top of the food chain.
Sunday, August 9, 2009
She's Back
Sarah Palin is back in the news declaring that ObamaCare is evil:
The AP reports this as a lie
Fact Check actually goes farther in asserting the claim that this legislation "may place seniors in situations where they feel pressured to sign end of life directives they would not otherwise sign [which] may start us down a treacherous path toward government-encouraged euthanasia" is false:
FactCheck's "non-partisan" reasoning is exceptionally weak. The facts that there is no requirement that seniors decline care and that seniors have ultimate control over their care speak in no way to the question of whether seniors may be pressured by counselors to make decisions they would not otherwise make. Even the intent of the original author, we all well know, is subsumed by the plain meaning of the authored words. Their evidence that this would not be a step on a slippery slope has even less to do with price of tea in china. In other words, Fact Check has a different basis for its conclusions than the available evidence.
In the long term, Boehner and Palin's claims are almost certainly true and Obama's FactCheck claim false. The key fiscal motivation for health care reform is spiraling medicare costs. End of life care is a major cost contributer: ~30% in the last year and 15% in the last 60 days. Bending the curve, then, requires meaningfully reigning in end-of-life care. Under the current rules, where seniors have, more or less, control over their care, this demands convincing them to refuse expensive treatment they would have otherwise opted for. Should persuasion fail to produce the required savings, some form of rationing can reasonably be expected.
I suspect that the most just means of rationing care -- end of life or other -- and the one -- I fear -- least likely to be adopted by the current administration, is to ensure that price signals are exposed to patients. If subsidized patients were required to pay a meaningful (as determined by individual financial situation) portion of the cost of their treatments, individuals could make personal choices in the context of their own values while, in aggregate, producing a result that best reflected the values of society.
"The America I know and love is not one in which my parents or my baby with Down Syndrome will have to stand in front of Obama's 'death panel' so his bureaucrats can decide, based on a subjective judgment of their 'level of productivity in society,' whether they are worthy of health care," the former Republican vice presidential candidate wrote.The AP reports this as a lie
The nonpartisan group FactCheck.org, a project of the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania says the claim is false...
Obama addressed the controversy during a July 28 AARP-sponsored town hall.
"Nobody is going to be forcing you to make a set of decisions on end-of-life care based on some bureaucratic law in Washington," he said.Fact Check actually goes farther in asserting the claim that this legislation "may place seniors in situations where they feel pressured to sign end of life directives they would not otherwise sign [which] may start us down a treacherous path toward government-encouraged euthanasia" is false:
We can’t argue with Boehner’s claim that counseling “may” cause more seniors to refuse treatment... but we see no evidence that it will. There’s certainly no requirement in the bill that seniors decline life support or extraordinary measures of medical treatment.
Furthermore, seniors have had control over the end-of-life issues the Republicans are concerned about for a long time...
As for the argument claiming that this is the first step on a slippery slope leading to government-encouraged euthanasia, that’s a stretch. The right to draw up an advance directive is federally guaranteed, but doctor-assisted suicide is legal in only three states. It would take a lot more than Medicare-funded counseling for voluntary euthanasia to become a standard government recommendation.
The original author of this part of the legislation responded... saying that "nothing could be further from the truth."FactCheck's "non-partisan" reasoning is exceptionally weak. The facts that there is no requirement that seniors decline care and that seniors have ultimate control over their care speak in no way to the question of whether seniors may be pressured by counselors to make decisions they would not otherwise make. Even the intent of the original author, we all well know, is subsumed by the plain meaning of the authored words. Their evidence that this would not be a step on a slippery slope has even less to do with price of tea in china. In other words, Fact Check has a different basis for its conclusions than the available evidence.
In the long term, Boehner and Palin's claims are almost certainly true and Obama's FactCheck claim false. The key fiscal motivation for health care reform is spiraling medicare costs. End of life care is a major cost contributer: ~30% in the last year and 15% in the last 60 days. Bending the curve, then, requires meaningfully reigning in end-of-life care. Under the current rules, where seniors have, more or less, control over their care, this demands convincing them to refuse expensive treatment they would have otherwise opted for. Should persuasion fail to produce the required savings, some form of rationing can reasonably be expected.
I suspect that the most just means of rationing care -- end of life or other -- and the one -- I fear -- least likely to be adopted by the current administration, is to ensure that price signals are exposed to patients. If subsidized patients were required to pay a meaningful (as determined by individual financial situation) portion of the cost of their treatments, individuals could make personal choices in the context of their own values while, in aggregate, producing a result that best reflected the values of society.
Saturday, August 8, 2009
Opposite Marriage
I've always thought it impossible to rationally oppose state certification of gay marriages. If two people are determined to pay extra taxes, well why not?
Conservatives are on stronger ground when they make it a question of process rather than outcome. There are good reasons to prefer state certification of gay marriage as the legislated product of a democratic process rather than imposed by judicial fiat (even if I suspect that that is what judges today looking only to law and precedent and ignoring political implication would do).
In a WSJ op-ed Princeton University Law Professor Robert George, takes his stab at arguing against same marriage, and, at first blush, succeeds in not looking the fool:
The most apparent weaknesses in his argument: We take for granted -- but it might not be the case -- that children are best reared in that context. Also the notion that Government regulation ought be limited to where it has a strong reason is not, unfortunately, shared by all Americans.
And, most fundementally, it would seem an awfully narrow view that limits the social value of opposite marriage to creating a context for rearing children.
Conservatives are on stronger ground when they make it a question of process rather than outcome. There are good reasons to prefer state certification of gay marriage as the legislated product of a democratic process rather than imposed by judicial fiat (even if I suspect that that is what judges today looking only to law and precedent and ignoring political implication would do).
In a WSJ op-ed Princeton University Law Professor Robert George, takes his stab at arguing against same marriage, and, at first blush, succeeds in not looking the fool:
...
[The state's interest in regulating marriage is] to make it more likely that, wherever possible, children are reared in the context of the bond between the parents whose sexual union gave them life.
If marriage is redefined, its connection to organic bodily union—and thus to procreation—will be undermined. It will increasingly be understood as an emotional union for the sake of adult satisfaction that is served by mutually agreeable sexual play. But there is no reason that primarily emotional unions like friendships should be... legally regulated at all.The most apparent weaknesses in his argument: We take for granted -- but it might not be the case -- that children are best reared in that context. Also the notion that Government regulation ought be limited to where it has a strong reason is not, unfortunately, shared by all Americans.
And, most fundementally, it would seem an awfully narrow view that limits the social value of opposite marriage to creating a context for rearing children.
Monday, August 3, 2009
Freedom Highway
I've been watching the wonderful The Clearwater Concert in celebration of Pete Seeger's 90th birthday party on PBS.
Springsteen anchored the show:
What is good for the goose is, as always, not for the gander: While Michael Franti and Patterson Hood did cover Dear Mr President, no one was impolite enough to mention Songs for John Doe
Springsteen anchored the show:
And then came Bruce. As the last artist of the night, Springsteen had the lengthiest remarks, with a speech that was an appreciation of Pete's place in history... Bruce spoke of ... Seeger as "the stealth dagger through the heart of our country's illusions about itself." ... and he described preparing for their duet on "This Land is Your Land" at the Inauguration, when Pete said: "I know I want to sing all the verses—all the ones that Woody wrote, even the two that usually get left out." Bruce summed up: "He sings all the verses, all the time—especially the ones we'd like to leave out of our history as a people."What is good for the goose is, as always, not for the gander: While Michael Franti and Patterson Hood did cover Dear Mr President, no one was impolite enough to mention Songs for John Doe
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