Political Architecture

As a software developer, I am in the habit of thinking about the manner in which the architecture of a process controls its results.

In the case of congressional decision making, the "primitives" (in the software, not anthropological sense) are Congressfolk whose above-all-else motivation is re-election.

There are two rough dynamics which control re-election. Many Congressfolk -- Representatives from highly gerrymandered districts and Senators from reliably red or blue States -- have relatively safe seats. These Congressfolk face greater risk of being primaried out -- for being too moderate for their base -- than losing in the general election for being too partisan or idealogical. Other Congressfolk, facing more competitive electorates, can ill afford being seen as too partisan or idealogical.

Congressional seniority rules guarrantee that party leadership will be largely composed of the less moderate safe seats Congressfolk.

Best of the Web points out that Pelosi's healthcare push, surprising in light of the election, is good for her personal re-election prospects.

At this point the argument that the interest of Blue Dog Democrats lies in opposing the Obama agenda, is wrong headed. Voters angry with Obama or Pelosi are not going to vote for Democrats, whatever their voting records. If Republicans really wanted to kibbosh the Obama agenda they would offer Blue Dogs a place under their big tent. They, of course, have other motivations.

The limiting constraint on the radicalism of the safe seated Congressfolk is that their power depends on the size of their caucus which depends on their ability to recruit and re-elect moderate candidates. It is likely too late for the moderate candidates recruited by Democrats the past two cycles and this will all serve to discourage future recruitment.

It was once said that American politics operated between the forty-yard lines. Since the passage of McCain/Finegold, American politics operates more stably in the red zone.