Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Opposite Marriage on Trial

In his opening statement, Ted Olson promised to prove:
  1. The importance of marriage.
  2. The "grievous harm" worked by denying the right to marry.
  3. There is "no good reason" to deny homosexuals this right.
The first two items are red herrings. Whatever the tangible benefits of marriage, they certainly come far more from the commitment of the couple than the tax implications. The notion -- suggested by Olson -- that a couple cannot fully "share their dreams" with each other without state sanction is silly (and mildly ironic given his backers).

The true injury caused by Prop 8 is symbolic. As well described by Olson:
All it does is label gay and lesbian persons as different, inferior, unequal, and disfavored. And it brands their relationships as not the same, and less-approved than those enjoyed by opposite sex couples. It stigmatizes gays and lesbians, classifies them as outcasts, and causes needless pain, isolation and humiliation.
On the other hand, state sanctioning of gay marriage causes similar symbolic injury (stigmatization) to adherents of traditional religion. Decision via judicial rather than political process aggravates the injury as one's voice is, at least, more fully heard in a political process.

Reading Olson's statement more carefully, the injury he describes is inflicted less by the denial of state sanction as much as by the societal mores that support the status quo. The majority of Americans, as expressed by their votes, consider homosexual "relationships inferior and less-deserving of respect and dignity," a view that, if Roe v Wade is any guide, judicial interference will only harden. In the end, then, what plaintiffs seek is not to remedy their injury as much as the compensatory satisfaction of asserting their political power over the majority that dis-respect them.

In a prior post, I expressed agreement in principle with the third item. Or rather, that there appears no rational reason to oppose sanctioning gay marriage. Opposition is rooted in accepted tradition.

What is on trial, then, appears to be whether or not, in the eyes of the law, traditional values constitute a "good reason".

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