Israel and The Arab Spring

Drudge headlines: Obama, Cameron compare themselves to Reagan, Thatcher for over-seeing the Arab Spring.

USA Today reports that Israelis are wary of the Arab Spring for good reason:

Tarek Khouly, a coordinator for the April 6th youth movement in Cairo... says "We're not at a situation now where we can confront Israel... Once Egypt is strong... Israel will choose to go away."

Netanyahu, in his adress to Congress, warned that the democratic "hopes could be snuffed out, as they were in Tehran in 1979... [and] Lebanon’s democratic Cedar Revolution.". Ben Stein argues they were a fraud to start with.

The simple truth is this: The Arab world has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to re-ground their societies in liberty and democracy. Whether -- or to what degree -- they succeed, or whether they condemn themselves to another generation of tyranny, will be a strong function of whether they -- paraphrasing Golda Meir -- love their own more than they hate the other. It is most straightforwardly so in Syria, where Assad would long ago been overthrown if Alawites didn't reasonably fear massacre, but it is equally true in Egypt where both the Army and Muslim Brotherhood will happily manipulate passions to thwart liberty and democracy.

Obama's Audacious AIPAC Speech

The President, in his address to AIPAC, argued that "the march to isolate Israel internationally — and the impulse of the Palestinians to abandon negotiations" has gained "momentum in the absence of a credible peace process". Heading this off demanded he state explicitly the "1967 border" formula. In truth, the current absence of negotiations is largely due to an administration policy which, of all the complex and difficult issues, decided to focus on kitchen renovations in Efrat, strengthening the Palestinian "impulse" to abandon negotiations. More to the point, there are fundamental issues raised if the "march to isolate Israel internationally" is strengthened, not weakened, by Palestinians abandoning negotiations, and hard to see how the presidents policy speaks to those issues.

He then clarified that "'1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps' means... a border that is different than the one that existed on June 4, 1967." He implied that those who criticized him where of bad faith, or limited English comprehension. In this he misses (willfully?), the point. There is a clear difference -- in framing negotiations -- between stating that the final borders will look something like the 1967 borders adjusted for demographic realities and security needs -- what "everyone knows" and he clarified himself as having meant -- and that the 1967 borders represent the basis for negotiation -- what it easily sounded like he said.

More to the point, this maneuvering is taking place under the shadow of the Palestinian determination to seek statehood at the UN in September. A determination which, itself, the President inspired. It would certainly further "the march to isolate Israel internationally" should it entail recognition of the 1967 borders without reference to demographics or security. Supporters of Israel are right to fear that the President's speech will be easily, predictably, used to further that cause.

Obama's Middle East Speech

In his latest speech, the President layed out his view of the middle east negotiations.

Upon any reflection, his layout is as coherent as the sound of one hand clapping. Or rather, he manages to be on two sides of the fence at once. On one hand, he grants Israel military presence in the Jordan River valley ("Israel must be able defend itself - by itself - against any threat"), one the other hand he precludes it ("The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps"). On one hand, he closes off any right of return of Palestinians to Israel ("Israel as a Jewish state and the homeland for the Jewish people"), on the other hand he leaves it open ("two wrenching and emotional issues remain: the future of Jerusalem, and the fate of Palestinian refugees"). Ultimately, he asserts, the only thing "America and the international community can do is state [this all] frankly."

Netanyahu's response appears childishly imperious. A savvier diplomatic response would be to accentuate the hand that defended Israel's position, and ignore the other hand. On the other hand, Netanyahu's response reflects the seriousness of the stakes -- millions of lives in balance -- where-as Obama's empty speech reflects less world-concerned foreign policy, and more re-election concerned, domestic political posturing.